Welcome to The Counter-Terrorism Page. The CTPage has been existence - on and off - since 1994, and was the first web sites dedicated to the study of Counter-Terrorism, violent political movements, and low intensity conflict.
The CTPage has undergone many incarnations over the years, but has consistently retained a focus on the study of CT, free from hyperbole. Steering away from judgements is an objective we have aspired to.
To achieve this objective, we have focused on presenting information, and not our own analysis. As a result you will discover information from a variety of open sources including Governments, NGOs, Academics and professionals. Each may have their own point of view, and we hope that this approach will inform the discussion, rather than act as advocate for any point of view.
Naturally, all content does reflect the author's point of view, but we hope that by presenting diverse well structured and credible information we will assist understanding of the context for terrorism and terrorist activities. Our hope is that this can inform the development of policy, strategy, and analysis.
NEW YORK (Reuters) - Computer hackers briefly hijacked Twitter.com on Thursday, redirecting its users to a website where a group calling itself "Iranian Cyber Army" claimed responsibility for the disruption.
It was unlikely that the Iranian government itself was involved despite its dislike of social networking sites and years of discord with the United States over its nuclear program, experts said.
Twitter was apparently disrupted for about two hours by the group, which replaced the Twitter home page with a headline reading "This site has been hacked by Iranian Cyber Army" and an anti-American message.
Assam: Crippling the ULFA Wasbir Hussain Associate Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi; Director, Centre for Development and Peace Studies, Guwahati
Trans-border terror in South Asia received a severe setback on November 4, 2009, when two top leaders of the separatist United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) fell into the hands of the Indian Security Forces (SFs). The official version of the story is that ULFA’s self-styled ‘foreign secretary’ Sashadhar Choudhury and ‘finance secretary’ Chitraban Hazarika were trying to sneak back into India from Bangladesh, when they were captured by Border Security Force (BSF) troopers near Gokulnagar in Tripura. The duo was then handed over to a visiting Assam Police team on November 6, who brought them over to Guwahati and produced before a magistrate. The next day, the magistrate sent them on a ten-day Police remand. Though there is reason to believe that the duo were actually picked up by Bangladesh authorities and informally handed over to the Indian side, there are complex reasons why both New Delhi and Dhaka prefer that people believe the official version. In any event, the fact remains that the pair has been captured and is now in Indian custody, after years on the run.
KIM BARKER is Edward R. Murrow Press Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Part I: Corruption
In his inauguration speech, Afghan President Hamid Karzai stressed the importance of the country's fight against corruption and spoke of his commitment to ending "the culture of impunity and violations of law." Afghans, however, reacted warily: they are waiting to see action, which has been in short supply in Afghanistan. Corruption has grown around Karzai like a fungus, touching almost every ministry and office. As Karzai begins his new term, this pervasive culture of graft is blamed for driving a wedge between Afghans and their government -- even driving some toward the Taliban.
Western officials have demanded that the Afghan government take decisive action against corruption, but such pressure may be counterproductive. Karzai has grown increasingly resentful of Western criticism, both because such treatment comes across as disrespectful in Pashtun culture and because Karzai believes that standing up to the United States will make him more popular with Afghans. Pressuring Karzai too often simply pushes him into a defensive crouch.
In a post-9/11 world, how does the U.S. government reconcile the need to provide security to its citizens without overstepping privacy laws, which are seen as fundamental rights in a democracy? Brookings hosts a discussion on a new book by Shane Harris, intelligence and homeland security correspondent at National Journal, on the rise of the American surveillance state over the past 25 years. Harris will offer his views on how our government’s intelligence strategy has made it harder to catch terrorists and easier to spy on everyday citizens.
In the last six months, al Qaeda has been linked to two attempts to attack the United States and a deadly attack on U.S. forces in Afghanistan. On March 9, Brookings hosted the launch of the paperback edition of The Search for Al Qaeda: Its Leadership, Ideology and Future (Brookings Press, 2008), written by Saban Center Senior Fellow Bruce Riedel, featuring a postscript based on these recent developments.
Recent months have seen an increase in Pakistani involvement in the fight against the Taliban in the Middle East, including a sudden surge in arrests of the terrorist network's top leaders. Although Pakistan's motives behind this policy shift remain unclear, Bruce Riedel writes that it may be a sign of meaningful progress in the war on terror.
In response to a recent campaign demanding that the Justice Department release the names of attorneys defending Guantánamo detainees, a group of attorneys, former officials and policy specialists who have worked on detention issues—including Brookings's Ben Wittes and Robert Chesney—issued a statement condemning the action and affirming the American tradition of representing unpopular defendants in court.
As the Obama administration works to renew ties with the Muslim world, Shadi Hamid and Steven Brooke write that the promotion of democratic reform in the Middle East should be given a higher priority. The authors argue that promoting democracy remains the most effective way to undermine terrorism and political violence in the region.
Samar: What can the United States hope to do in order to minimize the intrusion of Iran in all sectors of Iraq, most especially in the Iraqi government? Would the United States prefer to see a Sunni government or a Shia one beholden to the Iranian government?
Omar: Which side are the Iraqi people and government more likely to choose, the United States or Iran? (Question submitted via RealClearWorld)
This week, Reidar Visser answers reader questions about the upcoming Iraqi elections and the political future of the country.
As the years pass, the Cold War increasingly appears as an undifferentiated chunk of history that stretched across time and space, with a vast cast of characters and occasional moments of drama. It is presented as a curious concatenation of summits and negotiations, alliances and clients, spies and border posts, ideological dogmas and underground resistance, and a combination of arcane theories about deterrence and some nasty actual wars.
The magisterial Cambridge History of the Cold War views the Cold War as an undifferentiated chunk of history. But the conflict between the superpowers was just one strand of history in the middle and late twentieth century, not the whole story.
The Islamic Republic of Iran is determined to become the world's tenth nuclear power. It is defying its international obligations and resisting concerted diplomatic pressure to stop it from enriching uranium. It has flouted several UN Security Council resolutions directing it to suspend enrichment and has refused to fully explain its nuclear activities to the International Atomic Energy Agency. Even a successful military strike against Iran's nuclear facilities would delay Iran's program by only a few years, and it would almost certainly harden Tehran's determination to go nuclear.
Summary:
Despite international pressure, Iran appears to be continuing its march toward getting a nuclear bomb. But Washington can contain and mitigate the consequences of Tehran's nuclear defiance, keeping an abhorrent outcome from becoming a catastrophic one.
Tehran's acquiring a nuclear bomb need not remake the Middle East -- if Washington wisely exploits Tehran's weaknesses.
Keir Lieber and Daryl Press ("The Nukes We Need," November/December 2009) argue that to deter the growing number of nuclear-armed states against which it might have to fight a conventional war, the United States should develop a new generation of accurate low-yield nuclear weapons. They contend that "the least bad option in the face of explicit nuclear threats or after a limited nuclear strike may be a counterforce attack to prevent further nuclear use."
Summary:
Does the United States need to update its nuclear arsenal so that it can destroy an enemy's nuclear weapons? Or should Washington instead work to eliminate nuclear weapons altogether? Keir Lieber and Daryl Press take on their critics.
In his inaugural address, U.S. President Barack Obama informed those regimes "on the wrong side of history" that the United States "will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist." He soon backed up his words with deeds, making engagement with U.S. adversaries one of the new administration's priorities. During his first year in office, Obama pursued direct negotiations with Iran and North Korea over their nuclear programs. He sought to "reset" relations with Russia by searching for common ground on arms control, missile defense, and Afghanistan.
Summary:
During his first year in office, U.S. President Barack Obama made engagement with U.S. adversaries one of his administration's priorities. The historical record makes clear that Obama is on the right track: reaching out to adversaries is an essential start to rapprochement.
When it is handled correctly, engagement is not appeasement; it is sound diplomacy.
Obama must manage the domestic backlash that accompanies the accommodation of adversaries.
It takes years to turn enmity into amity. The problem for Obama is that patience is in short supply in Washington.
