Dr. B. Harasymiw

February 1990
Unclassified

Editors Note: This issue of Commentary is devoted to the second of a three-part series on events in the Soviet Union, by Dr. B. Harasymiw, the Strategic Expert on Soviet Affairs within the Analysis and Production Branch (RAP) of CSIS.

Disclaimer: Publication of an article in the Commentary series does not imply CSIS authentication of the information nor CSIS endorsement of the author's views.

Recent Soviet press interviews with officers of the Committee for State Security (KGB) give a glimpse of how the secret police is adapting to perestroika. The thinking underlying these changes is interesting, since it indicates a broader, rather than shrinking, domestic role for the KGB in the reform process launched by Gorbachev. Far from dragging its feet on perestroika, the KGB sees in it opportunities to extend its institutional interests and influence.

The Holushko Interview

In one of the longest of these articles, the KGB Chairman in Ukraine, N.M. Holushko, offers a comprehensive account of his agency's current reorientation (Pravda Ukraine, 3 September 1989, p. 2).

Holushko is asked whether in a low-governed state (one of the announced objectives of perestroika) the organs of state security must be controlled by the party and the people rather than controlling them. Holushko's response is that, of course the KGB ought to be made responsible to the legislature, and that the myth of its dominance over the party and the public ought to be relegated to the archives. He goes on to say that a new law on state security is being formulated by the Soviet parliament and is of extraordinary importance for the tasks of the KGB. The new law will regulate in particular the agency's investigative, operational and preventative work. That Holushko welcomes the statutory definition and delineation of the KGB's work suggests that he sees this as operating to the benefit of his agency, rather than as a restriction on it.

It underlines the difference between the concept of the "law-governed state" and that of the "rule of law." The new law on state security is welcomed because it will provide a legal basis for KGB operations, not a check on them, at least from the KGB's point of view. Although one cannot rule out the possibility of this law, or any others in the reform program, being used to protect the citizen from the state instead of vice versa, it is well to understand that under the present circumstances when civil rights are not yet fully established in the Soviet Union the KGB should certainly be glad to take advantage of the opportunity to participate in the formulation of legislation to "regulate" its domestic activities.

Changes are already underway in the KGB, Holushko told the interviewer, in advance of the new legislation. In particular, new structural subdivisions to deal with organized crime and to defend the constitutional order are being created, and the definition of the competency of KGB organs is being narrowed. In addition, old cases are being reviewed, and many people are being rehabilitated or pardoned. There are hopeful signs that the tragic thirties will not be repeated, he said.

It may have been significant that the first in a series of problems elaborated on by the Ukrainian KGB Chief in this interview was nationalism. Agreeing with Gorbachev, Holushko condemned what he called the "nationalistic insanity". The KGB's task, he said, was to prevent any violation of the principle of "the friendship of peoples," i.e., of the status quo, in Ukraine. The KGB therefore endeavours to keep abreast of (presumably through informers and infiltration) "extremist, anti-Soviet tendencies and trends, and to monitor dangerous situations which endanger the interests of the Soviet people. . . ." Since the Supreme Soviet has outlawed the advocacy of violence to change the government, and has done the same for violations of the equal rights of citizens, the KGB, according to Holushko, has a legal basis for apprehending anyone who might use perestroika and democratization ideas for subversive purposes. For its success, perestroika needs the "friendship of peoples". It obviously does not need nationalism, and the KGB is ready to see to that. Holushko cautioned his readers that they ought to draw the appropriate lessons from the tense and difficult situation in the Baltics in this regard.

The increase in crime was the second major topic covered in the interview, which gave the KGB Chief yet another opening to argue for a bigger role for his agency in the era of glasnost' and perestroika. The KGB has been cooperating and will continue to cooperate with other bodies like the procuracy, the police and customs officials to capture criminals, including those engaged in crime in an organized way. The most serious crimes, those endangering security and the rights of citizens, are the focus of the KGB's main efforts. It must be borne in mind, in addition, that some criminals have considerable monetary resources derived from the shadow economy; they draw foreigners into their nefarious activities; and they even have weapons and other "modern technical means for pursuing their less that innocent aims". There are threats galore out there, the Chief was saying. Furthermore, the anxiety of citizens in the face of this increased crime rate (higher apparently in Ukraine that the national average, which was up 32% in the first half of 1989), is being needlessly augmented by the irresponsible demagoguery of nationalistic elements calling for political destabilization, which would lead to unforeseen consequences. Nationalist and other spontaneous political manifestations are therefore not welcome.

When asked next about the role of glasnost' in the activity of the security organs, Holushko declared that operating without it was simply unthinkable. He went on to wax eloquent about how much openness there had been regarding the Cheka in the lifetimes of Lenin and Dzerzhinsky (statues of whom, oddly enough, the Poles have been tearing down; see Ottawa Citizen, 18 November 1989, p. A23): "In those years, for example, reports on work of the All-Ukrainian Cheka were published in the press." So glasnost' should serve as a form of oversight from the public side. At the same time, secrecy is also still needed in investigations and counterintelligence operations. It would be naive to disclose all one's secrets to hostile intelligence services.

Another important aspect of the Ukrainian KGB's activity is ensuring the security of nuclear power stations. In this connection, the agency participated in the investigation of the reasons for the Chernobyl disaster, and is equipped to handle "the real danger of nuclear terrorism, attacks on atomic stations and crimes committed using various radioactive substances". Here again are still more threats real and imagined, but imagination is all that is needed to justify a larger role for the KGB in an otherwise reformed political system.

Further adding to the problems with which the KGB must cope, according to Holushko, is the opening of the republic's borders to the "friendly socialist countries". The increase in traffic across the republic's borders has resulted in an apparent increase in smuggling, currency and drug violations.

The opening of new opportunities for Soviet entrepreneurs to establish direct business relations with their foreign counterparts, instead of operating through government ministries as before, has created an altogether new role for the KGB. Owing to their lack of experience in these business dealings, in Holushko's view these innocent individuals need the help of the KGB to protect their interests. The KGB, in other words, is offering its services for commercial espionage, to ascertain the true bargaining positions of foreign businesses and to use this intelligence for advantage of the Soviet firm. Holushko cites a testimonial to this effect, in which the KGB's assistance "permitted avoiding the conclusion of an agreement with a Western firm on terms disadvantageous to us, and to save on this $8 million". Holushko does not indicate whether this success was achieved by technical or human means or both, nor whether it took place abroad or in the Soviet Union. In any case, this may be a signal of a newer direction for the KGB-not just the theft of government, scientific, military, or commercial secrets, but spying on commercial firms who deal with Soviet enterprises. Canadian businessmen who have dealings with their Soviet counterparts should therefore be cautioned to take particular care in ensuring the security and confidentiality of company information as well as of negotiating strategy. For the Soviets, and for the KGB in particular, greater permeability of borders does not mean less surveillance of ordinary tourists, but more of a focus on business travellers.

In the final portion of his interview, Holushko dealt with the KGB's humanitarian work in the area of rehabilitation of the victims of repression from the 1930's through to the 1950's (about one third of the lifetime of the USSR). He gave some statistics on the numbers of cases reviewed to date, gave assurances that the KGB would help relatives to find the burial places of their late lamented loved ones accidentally victimized by history, expressed regret that the KGB's archival records were lacking in data on the exact dates and places of many of these deaths, and suggested that monuments ought to be erected to the victims of Stalinism in half a dozen Ukrainian cities.

The Kriuchkov Interview

On 26 October 1989, Izvestiia (Moscow evening edition, p. 3) published an interview with the Chairman of the USSR KGB, Vladimir Kriuchkov, entitled "Perestroika in the KGB." Western press reports have already highlighted the admission made in it about organizational changes to the agency's structure, but the interview touched on several other matters of interest.

For the sake of accuracy and completeness, what Kriuchkov said about internal organizational changes within the KGB was that indeed, in accordance with a government degree, a new Administration (or Department) for the Defence of the Soviet constitutional Order has been set up. He pointed out, however, that the initiative fore this came from the agency itself. If true, it means that the new legislation is less a form of oversight than en expression of the institutional interests of the KGB itself, that the KGB is still able to define itself and determine its own direction regardless of perestroika. At the same time, the Fifth Department, established in 1967 and tasked to combat ideological diversions, has been abolished. Its abolition, however, will not result in a significant reduction in the size of the KGB because the unit itself was one of the smallest to begin with. (The KGB follows, obviously, the well-known bureaucratic principles when it comes to effecting cuts to itself.) Nor will this free up any buildings, as anticipated in the interviewer's questions, because the Fifth took only a part of one of the administrative buildings.

The cut becomes part of the improvement of the organizational apparatus. Some of the former staff have been retired, while several individuals have been reassigned elsewhere in the organization, at the centre and in the localities. Creation of the new Department required a certain regrouping which is now going on, all of which means that the cutting of the Fifth Department was relatively painless, and the new Department is not really new in terms of personnel, but rather a conglomeration of KGB men well-steeped in the culture of the organization and not likely to operate a whole lot differently that before perestroika.

Whereas Holushko's world was full of threats (which thus justified his organization's expanding role and confirmed its dedication), Kriuchkov's is full of unseen conspiracies and subversion. According to Kriuchkov, perestroika has brought about important changes in the country and the world; it has changed international relations through the new political thinking; it is facilitating contacts and cooperation. At home, in an atmosphere of glasnost', Kriuchkov says, a profound reform of the political system is taking place, the economy is being transformed, the public is politically active, and a law-governed state is being created. In the midst of all this, there are those (not further specified) inside and outside the country who are trying to use the process of renewal "for weakening and undermining socialism". Here is the secret policeman's logic at work: freedom is chaos; liberty is dangerous; openness means more subversion; relaxation of international tensions requires even greater vigilance.

The new Department has as its twin objectives, according to Kriuchkov: "The defence of the Soviet constitutional order against the subversive activity of the special services of foreign states [i.e., foreign intelligence services], and of anti-Soviet centres abroad," on the one hand, as well as against "criminal attempts of anti-socialist elements within the country," on the other. Of course, this defence of the constitutional order is a responsibility shared with other state institutions, the Soviet society as a whole and individual Soviet citizens. We're all in this together, comrades.

Asked what had prompted the creation of the old Fifth Department, what functions it fulfilled, and why it was abolished, Kriuchkov gave the following "historical" account. Right after the war, foreign intelligence services, and the emigré anti-Soviet organizations associated with them, attempted to create within the USSR a fighting underground. Later, the idea caught on in the West of undermining the socialist order by peaceful means while at the same time engaging in the arms race. At the beginning of the sixties, says Kriuchkov, an official doctrine of "the erosion of socialism from within" was proclaimed, as a consequence of which foreign intelligence turned its attention to ideological activity aimed at certain segments of Soviet society. This activity became known as "ideological diversion". Responsibility for counteracting it was given to the Fifth Department, which scored numerous successes in the apprehension and prevention of such subversion.

What is interesting about this account is the evolution of the KGB's principal domestic concern from the physical to the metaphysical. Following its success in eliminating the physical threat, it had to respond to-or invent-an ideological threat. In fact, there was perceived to be such a threat in the form of the Cold War attitudes in the West, which made the KGB's self-justification easier. The amorphousness of ideology, and the intangible nature of the psychological, also provided assurance of a broad and long-lasting sphere of activities for the KGB. Ideological subversion as a target thus gave the KGB unlimited scope for action. But this had to change of necessity once glasnost' began to take effect, because in the open discussion of ideas there can be none that are subversive (unless they are openly so, and dealing with them becomes then a matter of applying the criminal law, not of undercover operations), and because there is now practically no official ideology to subvert.

From the early 1970s, says Kriuchkov, the world has been threatened by terrorism, which has even had an influence on certain "socially dangerous elements in our country". We didn't talk about this before, but from 1970 into the 1980s, over 1,500 persons were discovered by the KGB to be involved in terrorism.

Of course, during the course of its operations, the old Fifth Department made a certain number of mistakes. But this, Kriuchkov says, was partly the fault of the laws which were vague and imprecise. These having now been abrogated or more strictly worded, only advocacy or use of violence to change the Soviet system or dissemination of materials for such ends will attract the attention of the KGB. Thoughts and beliefs are no longer a target of the security agency, Kriuchkov announces.

The specific and basic tasks of the new Department, therefore, are to be the following. First, it is to intercept the attempts of foreign intelligence "to create and to make use of, for anti- constitutional aims, organized anti-state groupings in our county". Second, it must "prevent and intercept the criminal activities of persons attempting by violent means to overturn or change the Soviet governmental and social order". Third, it will uncover and prevent terrorist acts. Fourth, it has to control or prevent "mass disturbances and other unlawful manifestations of an extremist character". Finally, it will cooperate with other institutions in the fight against organized crime. (How the KGB can credit itself with doing such a great job of guarding the Soviet state from threats to its security in the past, and now be engaged in fighting organized crime, is a question that needs to be, and no doubt is being, asked in the USSR.) In view of the political situation in many regions of the country, says Kriuchkov, the attention of his organization will be focused also on those anti-constitutional activities aiming to arouse inter-ethnic animosities, and particularly to prevent those where weapons are used to provoke extremist responses. Letters to the KGB from workers express demands for action by the agency in this regard. There is, in other words, public support to take action against nationalists and separatists, according to the KGB Chief.

The USSR KGB Collegium

Just after the Kriuchkov interview, there was a press report of a meeting of the KGB Collegium, its collective policy-making body, which considered the organization's tasks insofar as defence of the constitutional order was concerned (Pravda, 2 November 1989, p.3; for the text in English, see FBIS 100NOV01 "USSR; KGB Discusses New Task Under Glasnost".) The resemblance of this document to the Kriuchkov interview suggests that the latter was in fact not conducted face- to-face, but in written form, a common practice in Soviet journalism.

The report repeats the litany of positive achievements of perestroika, as well as that of its negative concomitants. It also repeats the mention of the new government decision to abolish the Fifth Department and to replace it with another as having been made subsequent to a proposal by the KGB. The tasks of the new Department, it says, are to counteract foreign intelligence operations, to disrupt their attempts at the internal political destabilization of the country, to prevent the advocacy of violence, to prevent mass disturbances, to stop terrorists and to halt inter-ethnic hostilities. The organization as a whole, it points out, is also concerned with organized crime and its links to the international criminal world (returning ill-gotten gains to the state treasury), corruption, and the physical safety of citizens. In its activities, the Collegium directed the KGB to follow the law more closely and to place more emphasis on prevention rather than apprehension.

The Uzbek KGB

Two reports on the KGB in Uzbekistan (Pravda Vostoka, 27 October 1989, p.3, and 5 November 1989, p.7), confirm the themes of justice and vigilance noted in the earlier ones reviewed above. From them we learn that in this Central Asian republic, the KGB is also rehabilitating those who unjustly perished and helping to find their burial places, and that the NATO intelligence services are in fact burrowing their way deviously into deepest Uzbekistan.

Comment

From the above, it is difficult to decipher whether the KGB is fully committed to perestroika, or is in principle opposed to it. A reasonable conclusion would be that the KGB is certainly not restructuring itself in any fundamental way that might imply a liberalization of its institutional outlook. It still sees threats and conspiracies, both inside and outside the country. It sees more opportunities for expanding its operations than for cutting back on them. What the KGB does seem to be doing, in fact, is adapting or rearranging itself to perestroika under cover of glasnost', but not by any means preparing to be less paranoid, less powerful, or less intrusive. Adaptation, not actual reform, seems to be the KGB's game. Is it really on Gorbachev's side in wanting change? A Polish sociologist is said to have a theory, for example, that the KGB has engineered the Changes in Eastern Europe (Christian Science Monitor, 21 November 1989, p.4.) Or does it want stability and the status quo?

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