Dr. R. D'A. Henderson

March 1991
Unclassified

Editors Note: This is the last in a three-part Commentary series on security-related events in South Africa, by Dr. R. D'A. Henderson, Strategic Analyst in the Analysis and Production Branch (RAP) of CSIS.

Disclaimer: Publication of an article in the Commentary series does not imply CSIS authentication of the information nor CSIS endorsement of the author's views.

Since Taking Office

Reflecting on his first 10 months in office, F.W. de Klerk wrote in The Times of London (9 July 1990) "my greatest hope is to bring about a just and fair South Africa by peaceful means", while "the greatest danger is for radicalism and escalating conflict to get out of hand". To counter this, he said, his government would need to "firmly and fairly" maintain law and order.

Following his landmark February 1990 speech which announced the legalization of extra-parliamentary political organizations and called for a "normalization" of political activity in the country, the South African media made repeated references to an emerging pattern of toenadering-an Afrikaans word for rapprochement-between the de Klerk government and the African National Congress (ANC) leadership under its vice-president, Nelson Mandela. However, in the face of rising violence particularly in Natal, the apparent inability of the South African Police (SAP) to control it and the growing opposition claims of clandestine agitation by elements of the government security forces themselves, initial local expectations of a "new and stable" political environment faded.

In the face of mounting international and domestic criticism about the level of violence, the de Klerk government chose to act forcibly to contain the most serious violence and unrest. On April 2, de Klerk announced in Parliament that comprehensive steps would be taken to restore law and order and that "ample additional manpower supplied by the [South African] Defence Force was already deployed in the [black unrest] areas". With the support of SADF infantry companies, the SAP unrest [riot] units were able to suppress the major factional fighting in the Natal midlands. However, with the August outbreak of the township warfare between hostel-based migrant workers and residents in the black townships on the Rand around Johannesburg, SADF troops again had to be deployed in support of SAP unrest units.

Declaring on June 8 that there was no longer a need for extraordinary emergency powers except in Natal, the de Klerk government did not renew the State of Emergency-in effect since 1986-which had provided government security forces with a wide range of powers to suppress violence and anti-state activities. On October 16, the emergency powers were dropped in Natal as well, although the government still retained a broad array of security legislation including the Internal Security Act. While there is no indemnification for the government security forces for their actions, as there was under the now-lifted State of Emergency regulations, section 29 of the Act continues to permit detentions without trial. In February 1991, Minister of Law and Order Adriaan Vlok declared that "we [the government] still need section 29" and that it would stay in place until a new constitution was implemented in South Africa.

All these actions accord with de Klerk's reformist interpretation of "law and order", as guaranteeing the physical security of the white population through the period of negotiations on the country's political future [see Commentary #5, August 1990]. However, his dilemma has been how to normalize the political process without increasing the violence which has emerged as a result of rising political and economic expectations. All sides in South Africa now acknowledge that only by an effective containment of the growing violence, while ensuring the inclusion of all parties with "proven support" (according to the ANC), will it be possible to negotiate a new political system.

In the face of politically motivated unrest and rising crime, will de Klerk be able to orchestrate the available "instruments of state power"-government security forces as well as competing non-state paramilitary forces both within the country and outside-to contain violence? And will he then be able to ensure that all South Africans have physical security, or will his inability to control these diverse instruments result in further factional fighting within the country as well as extremist acts of violence both within South Africa and beyond its borders?

Rising Violence as a Result of "Normalization"

As both political expectations and fears have risen, so have various types of violence. These include ones of societal origin including the destructive results of apartheid policies as well as those which are politically motivated [see Commentary #7, December 1990]. While the societal violence can be reduced ultimately only by substantial socio-economic improvements, containment of politically motivated violence will almost certainly necessitate greater use of state power by the de Klerk government.

According to the South African Institute of Race Relations, between September 1984 when the present cycle of violence first erupted, and the end of October 1990, there had been almost 9,000 political violence fatalities, more than a third of these in 1990 alone. Further, whereas government security forces had accounted for most of the political fatalities when the violence erupted nationwide in 1984, the intra-communal conflict between black factions has now become the main source of casualties. A substantial portion of this current violence is between ANC supporters and supporters of other black political organizations which are excluded at present from the "talks on talks" between the de Klerk government and the ANC National Executive Committee. As a result, black urban township residents, school-age youths, migrant workers and squatters, as well as many of those dwelling in rural homelands, have been drawn increasingly into the spreading political violence.

Even with the decision to permit the State of Emergency to lapse, the de Klerk government still retains considerable powers of arrest and detention under a wide range of security legislation. Failure to repeal the remaining security legislation continues to constitute a major obstacle between the government and the ANC, as the government has so far agreed only to review the legislation. As a result of its December 1990 Consultative conference, the ANC National Executive Committee issued an ultimatum to the government, in effect demanding that the government act decisively on four issues, including the repeal of all security legislation, by a deadline of 30 April 1991. Otherwise, the ANC would break off talks while reserving the right to resume "the armed struggle", despite its largely symbolic nature. The other demands were the repatriation of the estimated 20,000 South African "exiles", release of all political prisoners and a government-enforced end to the black-on-black communal violence in the townships and rural homelands.

De Klerk's Dependence on Government Security Forces

Immediately following the ANC ultimatum, de Klerk responded firmly with a nationally telecast address stressing that "the maintenance of law and order is not negotiable ... the first duty of a responsible government is to protect the lives and property of all of its citizens". He went on to state that his government was "determined to take all necessary steps to maintain law and order throughout the whole [South African] community" and would "not shrink back from using all available resources to ensure stability.

He continued with a long list of examples of "unacceptable" behaviour, including violence for whatever excuse, intimidation, incitement of racial hatred, non-payment for essential community services, mass action aimed at forcing political concessions and increasing incidence of crime. But he made two promises for 1991: to intensify "unbiased" police activities to prevent "crime, disorder, unrest and intimidation" and to "stabilize local government" so that basic services could be supplied to "all black communities".

Repeatedly, anti-apartheid opposition groups have claimed that there is biased and even agitational involvement in the ongoing violence by "elements" from the SAP, the SADF and the South African intelligence community-the so-called sinister third force. Despite these criticisms, de Klerk has continued to point to the loyalty of the government security forces as vital to maintaining stability within the country, albeit acknowledging the need for their impartiality. Previously in November, in a speech to the Southern Cross Fund, he had again re-affirmed that the well-being of South Africa was inextricably bound to "the maintenance of law, order and stability". In a time of rapidly changing circumstances, he stated, "it was necessary to have impartial security forces to protect South Africans and their property in a professional manner and to ensure that democratic rules were adhered to".

Although this continues to be his position, de Klerk has made significant changes in the structure of the South African security establishment. Since becoming president in 1989, he has quietly moved security policy-making away from the influential State Security Council (SSC)-dominated by "securocrats", seconded members from the security establishment-to his "civilian" administration. First, he brought the civilian National Intelligence Service (NIS) under his direct control within the Office of the State President. Next, he returned the SSC to its original role as an advisory unit, responsible to a cabinet security committee chaired by himself, and dissolved the SSC's National Security Management System with its network of regional security committees.

Turning to the South African Police, he reportedly instructed a meeting of 500 of his senior SAP commanders to concentrate on dealing with criminal activities, rather than maintain the previous strong emphasis on suppressing anti-state political activities-an area of particular responsibility for the SAP Security Branch. With a manpower establishment in 1990 of only 65,000 (about 60% black though a very low number in the officer ranks) and faced with rising resignations due to the changing political environment and attacks on township police stations, there was a perceived need to increase its anti-crime effectiveness and enforcement impartiality to improve both its morale and public image. As a result, the government approved in mid-1990 sizable salary increases as well as a major campaign to recruit an additional 10,000 constables (a 15% increase in manpower), almost all from the black community. At the same time, however, it announced a new departmental policy banning SAP personnel as well as new recruits being members of "any political party, movement or organization", although a parliamentary change to the Police Act is required to make such memberships an unlawful act.

Minister of Law and Order Vlok has promised to introduce such a change during the 1991 parliamentary session. In addition, he recently announced that the SAP Security Branch (the "security police") with about 4000 members would combine with the 8000 strong Criminal Investigation Division (CID) into a new, single unit from 1 April 1991, to be known as Crime Combatting and Investigation Unit (CCI). According to Vlok, "the [SAP] crime intelligence network needed to expand urgently and there was a vast source of knowledge and manpower in the Security Branch", although government critics already have suggested that the merger amounts to only a public relations exercise to lessen the anti-subversive image of the police.

In addition, the rising SAP manpower needs have been partially met with a number of auxiliary black units. SAP unrest units include black Kitskonstabels (special constables) for patrolling the urban townships despite only brief training. However, a number of fatal shootings of township residents involving these "instant constables" has resulted in popular demands for their replacement by new, well-trained municipal police forces which would not be under SAP control. In addition, police units employ an undisclosed number of Askaris ("turned" ANC guerrillas) and at least 250 former Namibian Koevoet members (a paramilitary police counter-insurgency unit previously used against SWAPO insurgents) to track down and identify infiltrators from the ANC's Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation - MK) paramilitary wing as well as members of paramilitary wings of other political organizations.

With the SADF withdrawal from its counter-insurgency and semi-conventional operations in Angola and Namibia in 1989, de Klerk has pointed out that South Africa no longer perceives a "major threat from across its borders". As a result, the defence budget has been cut significantly, various units and projects have been disbanded, and the two year white conscription of the citizen Force has been cut in half. According to the Chief of the South African Army, the army's primary role is now that of traditional deterrence against outside interference, but it also had to be able to conduct counter-insurgency operations as "the revolutionary was is not over yet", as well as assuming increasing responsibilities for anti-infiltration operations from SAP border units. Nonetheless, the continuing need to deploy troops in support of the SAP units in the black townships and in the Natal Midlands complicates the situation.

Despite "a slight manpower shortage", Deputy Defence Minister Wynand Breytenbach has expressed the SADF view that it could control the current unrest "by keeping warring factions apart". As a result, the South African government has relied even more heavily on its black ethnic battalions-about 40% of the SADF manpower-to contain the violence. Totalling approximately 5000 (25% of the full-time force), there are battalion size unites for South Sotho, Swazi, Venda, Shangaan, north Sotho and Zulu speaking troops as well as the Portuguese speaking "Buffalo" 32 Battalion recruited from southern Angola during the fighting there. In addition to their primary rural areas and border duties, several ethnic battalions have been used in Natal and the Rand townships for government-declared "impartial" security patrolling, or alternatively as "a black foreign legion" to use an expression from an earlier study [Kenneth W. Grundy, African Affairs, January 1981].

It is difficult to determine to what extent the various white and black parts of the government security forces will continue loyally to carry out instructions from the de Klerk government, particularly in view of their changing roles, the "new" political environment and escalating unrest. What is evident is that de Klerk has taken major steps to strengthen his control over the security establishment, even while retaining within his cabinet two key hard-line ministers from the previous securocrat-dominated P.W. Botha period: Minister of Defence General Magnus Malan and Minister of Law and Order Vlok.

Despite strong calls from the anti-apartheid opposition for their resignations and judicial findings that the SADF under Malan operated CCB "death squads" against anti-state activists, de Klerk has two major reasons for retaining them. Their inclusion in cabinet has tended to reassure his white supporters that law and order will be maintained and has helped undermine support for white conservative and extremist groups.

Opposition to De Klerk's "Law and Order" Approach

The present violence continues to generate serious criticisms of the will of the de Klerk government and its security forces to contain the unrest. For many in the black opposition, the government's decision to rescind the State of Emergency was seen as not going far enough to satisfy demands for an irreversible end to the apartheid system; white conservatives and extremists saw it as further evidence of a betrayal of government promises to protect the Afrikaner nation.

This failure to end the violence, according to anti-apartheid groups, is evidence that the government is pursing a so-called double agenda; calling for political negotiations on the one hand, while allowing the continuing violence to undermine the ANC's efforts to build its internal political structures and press for further government reforms on the other. Mandela has pointed out that the government has effective security forces to end the violence. "If the government wants to end the violence it would have done so. It has the capacity to do so. It has a well equipped police force and army. Why can it not be used to end the violence?"

Further, he charged in early December that government security forces are responsible for inciting much of the urban violence, in particular citing the SADF's Directorate of Military Intelligence and the civilian National Intelligence Service. Condemning the government's authorization for local township councilors to form so-called protection units under the Civil Protection Act as "an attempt to create vigilante groups", a number of ANC leaders including the MK Chief of Staff Chris Hani have argued that an end to apartheid and white minority rule will be irreversible only when the opposition forces have gained control of the instruments of state power, including the security forces.

Other black opposition groups, like the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) and the Azanian People's Organization (AZAPO), similarly have denounced the government security forces' failure to end the violence and have so far refused to enter into talks with the government. On the other hand, the Zulu Inkatha cultural association has openly conducted demonstrations in Natal with "pro-police, pro-defence force" placards. The ANC and its ally the United Democratic Front (UDF) charge that SAP unrest units have permitted, if not encouraged, violent attacks by pro-Inkatha-fighters against their supporters.

The opposition white Conservative Party (CP), led by Dr. Andries Treurnicht, as well as extremist groupings such as the Afrikaner Resistance Movement (AWB) have also criticized de Klerk for his "law and order" approach. However, their denouncements have been for being too "soft on security" and having "betrayed the [white/Afrikaner] nation". Although local media commentators have suggested that the substantial numbers of security force members have strong links to extremist groups, there has been little significant evidence. But Treurnich has expressed strong concern in May 1990 that white policemen leaving the force "are replaced by non-whites, it is a most, most unfortunate and most dangerous situation which is developing in this country .... we want our own people in our own security forces".

Non-Government Paramilitary Forces

In addition to the government security forces, there is also a variety of non-state paramilitary forces within the country or still in exile. Although even collectively not a match for the security forces, they do possess automatic weapons, various levels of military training and are widely scattered around the country. These divergent forces can be divided into those linked to ethnic homelands and those which are military wings of political organizations (black or white).

As part of the "grand apartheid" policy in the early 1960's, the Nationalist Government under H.F. Verwoerd demarcated 10 ethnic homelands composed of scattered pieces of rural areas. In an attempt to "denationalize" its black ethnic populations, five homelands were offered "independence" including their own defence forces. Local black politicians in the Transkei Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei-the so-called TBVC states-accepted and, under the SADF "total strategy" planning, each had a mini-army" of 2000-3000 troops created as an internal security force. Although lacking major conventional weapons, these counter-insurgency trained units were responsible for controlling their rural homelands against insurgent forces, especially the ANC's MK paramilitary wing.

The KwaZulu homeland under Chief Minister Mangosuthu Buthelezi refused this "independence" status. As a result, the Zulu speaking battalion created by the SADF has remained under the control of the south African government as part of the SADF ethnic battalions. However, the KwaZulu Police, created with SAP assistance and transferred "Zulu" SAP constables, have responsibility for "law and order" within the homeland and are under the direct control of Buthelezi as Minister of Police. In addition, Buthelezi is the leader of Inkatha which recently was restructured into the Inkatha Freedom Party. Although Inkatha has not acknowledged that it maintains separate security units, SADF officers reportedly have provided paramilitary training for "an elite unit of Inkatha fighters" as early as 1986.

Among the black insurgent forces, the ANC's MK paramilitary wing has by far the largest and best equipped force with an estimated 15,000 trained guerrillas in camps in Tanzania, Ethiopia and Uganda, although some MK units are being sought by the SAP Security Branch within South Africa. Additional MK units are in the Transkei with strong links to the Transkei Defence Force (TDF), including MK's armed assistance in opposing an attempted coup in November 1990 as well as reported conventional forces training by the TDF. Currently, the MK Chief of Staff Chris Hani is resident there, enjoying a close personal relationship with Transkei's leader, General Bantu Holomisa.

Over the past 12 months, Hanna has repeatedly called for more MK cadre recruitment and new underground structures within South Africa. He has also called for the creation of community "self defence units" in the strife-torn black townships on the Rand, promising that MK cadres would assist in organizing and training such units. Similarly, the South African Communist Party (SACP), in the October 1990 issue of its Umsebenzi periodical, argued for "the formation of township defence forces". In response, the SAP warned the ANC that creation of township defence units "could lead to civil war" and Inkatha denounced the plan as "no more than a thin disguise for Umkhonto we Sizwe to rebuild its underground terror structures". Surprisingly, the white extremist AWB declared that it had no objections to the planned self-defence units provided "they remained in their own [black township] areas only and left the white communities alone".

Despite all these calls for township "self defence units", the ANC agreed on 12 February 1991 to halt these MK activities, known as "related activities" to its armed struggle which had been publicly suspended in August. In some hard bargaining between de Klerk and Mandela, the ANC exchanged this concession for a government agreement to permit peaceful protest, quicker release of political prisoners and safe return of political exiles.

None of the other main black political organizations-the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), the Black Consciousness Movement of Azania (BCMA) and Azanian People's Organization (AZAPO)-possesses significant paramilitary wings. Although the PAC's Azanian People's Liberation Army has been estimated at between 1000 and 1500 members, they are considered poorly trained and equipped and are in distant exile camps in eastern Africa. The BCMA's paramilitary wing, the so-called "Azanian National Liberation Army", is estimated at less than 250 men with some military training, while there is at present no AZAPO paramilitary wing although it has militant township supporters.

Among the extremist white right-wing, there is a broad range of groupings, including vocal protesters, paramilitary organizations and urban terrorist groups, although it is difficult to determine their actual membership. As all whites in South Africa are required to serve in the armed forces, all of these right-wingers have received military training and almost all own personal firearms.

While rogue individuals or small gangs of fanatics continue to pose the major threat as the most likely perpetrators of periodic acts of terrorist violence, the large paramilitary organizations are well armed and number in the thousands of members-the main ones being the AWB's Wenkommando and the Boerestaat party's paramilitary wing, the Boere Weerstandsbeweging. Most of these organizations have adopted some form of "commando" [militia] structure and there have been repeated press reports of attempts to inter-link them into a huge right-wing "army" which could number as high as 30,000 members, but they still appear to be factionally divided.

De Klerk's Nnarrow Security Options

Shortly after the 1989 elections, de Klerk warned Western diplomats not to "expect me to reform myself out of power". He wants to fight and win the next general election during or before 1994. To do this, he must maintain a stable political environment, establish a coalition within which his Nationalist Party can retain a significant degree influence and negotiate a new constitutional system with broad inter-ethnic support but particularly from the white voters.

Can his government maintain or, as some local observers have suggested, even establish a stable political environment? Can he retain control over sufficient forces to suppress the politically motivated violence within the Country? This problem has become even more difficult and complex as the line between political and criminal violence continues to disintegrate. De Klerk basically has a harsh choice. He can continue his dependence on the government security forces while stemming the growth of community-based "self defence units" linked to political organizations, or he can agree to the creation of some sort of "joint security forces" which would merge government forces with parts of the various non-government paramilitary units.

Regardless of which path he follows, there is no guarantee against the eruption of internal warfare, encompassing more than just white-black violence. Such widespread fighting would further escalate the current crisis of criminal violence. Conversely, a failure to pursue successfully one or the other option would almost certainly result in substantially increased communal efforts to create their own "self-defence" units whether in black townships or white suburbs. Each option carries with it serious problems, both within South Africa and beyond its borders.

If de Klerk continues to depend on government security forces, the physical security of at least the white population would probably be guaranteed, in accord with his view of "law and order". Such a course of action would not antagonize the hard-line elements within the security establishment since it would increase their influence over the government's negotiating stance. Failure to impose similar levels of security for black residents in the urban townships and rural homelands would only heighten calls for "self defence units". In view of reduction to the SADF budget and white conscripts' period of national service, all efforts to maintain the necessary political stability will hinge on increased government use of its black security forces-the SADF "ethnic battalions" and increased numbers of black SAP constables. However, significant efforts to increase the non-white proportion of the government security forces may itself provoke a violent white extremist backlash.

If black South Africans cannot be accorded equal security against both political and criminal violence, there is little hope of achieving a new constitutional structure acceptable to all parties. Heribert Adam has suggested that "the South African conflict lends itself to bargaining and compromise when both sides are approximately equal in power, when the costs of apartheid maintenance exceed the benefits" [Ethnic and Racial Studies, July 1988, p.375]. The de Klerk government has already conceded that the socio-economic costs of apartheid are too great to continue, although the various opposition groupings show few signs of acting as a united front to the government. Nor, even if united, would they be equal to the government in terms of state power-the ability forcibly to impose their preferred policies. As noted by Dr. Gerrit Viljoen, Minister of Constitutional Development and one of de Klerk's closest advisers, "governing of the country will, during the negotiation process, continue to be the task of the present government-we cannot allow a vacuum of ungovernability to ensue". Further, the government has constantly and absolutely opposed any imposition during the transition period of an outside military force, such as the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) military units in the case of Namibia's independence process.

South Africa, already a militarized society, could be fragmented into geographical zones determined principally by the extent to which white or black communal "self-defence" formations can defend them. South African media commentators have repeatedly offered up the image of present-day Lebanon with its ethnic-religious divisions protected by local militias and outside of central government control. Such a scenario of ungovernability would mean the almost total collapse of the South African economy, based as it is upon the physical separation of industrial production facilities from its primarily black work force in the townships and homelands-despite the current repeal of the apartheid policies which create this societal deformity.

The other alternative of merging the various opposition paramilitary units with the government forces into a joint security force could prove just as hazardous. The first question would be whether to merge the SADF/SAP with the different paramilitary forces into a new security force or only to establish a liaison linkage between them. Next is the question of which opposition groupings posses "appropriate" military forces to be included in this process and do their forces require additional training to carry out defence or policing activities. Third, would these forces operate only in urban areas or would they be available nationwide including in the rural areas regardless of the ethnic composition there. And it is unclear if the "new" security force would require outside parties to monitor and perhaps train the selected personnel, as was the post-independence case in both Zimbabwe (1980) and Namibia (1990).

In its annual Anniversary Statement given by Mandela on January 8, the ANC declared that "the early installation of an interim government, with real power in fact and in law, and in control of all instruments of state power, is critical to the process of transition ... already we [ANC] have experienced problems from the fact that the ruling National party is both a player and a referee" [reprinted in SouthScan, 11 January 1991, p.5 - emphasis added]. MK leaders Joe Modise and Chris Hani have called for the return from exile of MK personnel as a military unit which would form an integral part of a future national defence force, merging with the SADF-an action which General Malan, speaking for the government, has publicly rejected on more than one occasion, despite local suggestions that the de Klerk government has privately already accepted the idea.

Prospects

For decades, successive South African governments have used tribal divisions in urban townships, migrant workers' hostels and mine compounds as well as in the rural homelands, as part of a deliberate technique of socio-political control. Deeply ingrained antagonisms are now being exploited in the factional fighting. These ethnic tensions will further boil over as living standards drop, due to rising food prices as well as high unemployment and underemployment. Violence which will continue to arise from this socio-economic malaise can be contained only through a combination of impartial policing nationally and economic growth, particularly in the depressed rural areas.

To succeed with his political reform process, de Klerk must ensure that his government retain control over sufficient black and white forces to be able to suppress all erupting politically motivated violence, and while reassuring white supporters as to their security, he must ensure black South Africans also will be secure. This will require that law and order be enforced impartially among blacks and whites. This can most likely be accomplished by a return to the earlier, high-profile toenadering between the de Klerk government and the ANC leadership, but enhanced this time by the establishment of some joint security forces which in turn would be responsible to a yet-to-be agreed multi-party transitional government.

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