Dr. W. Milward

June 1991
Unclassified

Editors Note: This issue of Commentary was written by Dr. W. Milward, Strategic Analyst on the Middle East in the Analysis and Production Branch (RAP) of CSIS.

Disclaimer: Publication of an article in the Commentary series does not imply CSIS authentication of the information nor CSIS endorsement of the author's views.

Strategic Background

The concept of security in the context of the Gulf region is historically conditioned and culture specific. The geopolitical dynamics of Southwest Asia in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are essentially the product of relationships among the local powers of the Gulf coast that were geographically isolated, regional powers centred in Baghdad, Riyadh and Tehran, and international powers such as the Ottoman Empire, Egypt, France, Germany, Russia and the United States. The historical experience of the region in recent decades has mandated a shift from traditional tribal and semi-nomadic perceptions of security to those associated with a more developed, industrialized and interdependent world. The response of rulers in the region has fallen far short of requirements.

In 1819 Ibrahim Pasha, son of Muhammad Ali, Viceroy of Egypt, acting on instructions from the Ottoman sultan-caliph in Istanbul to punish the house of Saud for its depredations in Mecca and Medina, marched inland across the Arabian peninsula from the Hijaz, bringing with him guns and money to buy off the allegiance of the Saudis' tribal allies; after six months of slaughter and siege his Turco-Egyptian troops bombarded the Saudi capital of Dar'iya into oblivion and temporarily checked the imperial strategy of the Saud family. "For the first time in recorded history the heartland of Arabia had been invaded and conquered by a foreign army, and the howitzers of Ibrahim Pasha taught a harsh lesson to the house of Sa'ud: what happened to a primitive society that provoked the wrath of a superior technology." [Robert Lacey, The Kingdom: Arabia and the House of Sa'ud, new York: Avon 1981, p.62].

More than a century and a half later this same superior technology was employed, again essentially by outsiders, to rescue the domains of sometime allies and confederates of the Saudis, the Sabahs of Kuwait, and secure the sovereignty of Saudi Arabia itself as a nation state. In the interim, concepts of security and strategic advantage have not altered generically; the largest change is the degree to which the presence of foreigners in the Gulf region, and the role they can play in strengthening the security of its peoples, has been factored into local calculations.

On the regional level the Gulf crisis of 1990 was the result of a long process of strategic stalemate and ferment in the Middle East. Since the Ottomans and Europeans withdrew their suzerainty over this region in the early and Middle decades of this century, the newly independent states of the area have been unable to reach a consensus on what constitutes adequate collective security, and the even more basic issue of legitimate ruling authority. A more convincing demonstration of this lack of consensus than the pernicious eight year conflict between Iran and Iraq would be difficult to find.

Pre-Crisis Security in the Gulf

In the early seventies the issue of Gulf security was dominated by the rivalry between Ba'thist Iraq and Pahlavi Iran and the dispute over their boundary in the Shatt al-Arab waterway. The rising power of Iran, following the Shah's self-appointed succession to the role of policeman of the gulf when Great Britain withdrew in 1971, liberally supplied with all manner of modern armaments by the Nixon administration, gave the Arab states of the Gulf cause for concern, especially when Iran occupied Abu Musa and the Tunbs, three small islands in the Strait of Hormuz, in 1972. There were significant Arab fears at the time of revanchist Iranian designs on Bahrain. On the other side of the ledger there was the example of continuing Iranian support for the counter-insurgency effort in Dhofar, and with the apparent settlement of the Iran-Iraq boundary dispute in the Algiers Accord of 1975, Arab fears of Iranian hegemonic ambitions in the Gulf were somewhat relaxed. The uneasy calm of the middle seventies was shattered by the Islamic revolution of 1978-79 in Iran.

Iran's Islamic revolution removed that country, at least temporarily, from its role as hegemonic power in the Gulf region. On the other hand it also encouraged the Iraqi leadership to identify opportunities to assert a larger regional role at Iran's expense. By knocking out a newly established and presumably vulnerable Islamic régime, Iraq could replace it as the dominant power of the region, while posing as the bulwark against the spread of the Shi'ite brand of Islamic fundamentalism. These assumptions, which led Saddam Hussein to attack his eastern neighbour in September 1980, represent the first in a series of serious strategic miscalculations by the Iraqi leader.

In the Arab world the response of Iraq's Gulf neighbours to the escalating conflict on their doorstep was to establish the Co-operation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC) on May 25, 1981, consisting of six Arabian peninsula countries: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. According to its Constitution, the GCC was to provide for economic, social and cultural co-operation and integration between and among its members, and establish a common security policy to protect the oil industry of the region.

Despite extensive discussion and collaboration on such matters as joint air defence systems and other supposedly integrated collective security measures, the GCC was created more with the threat of militant Iran in mind, and its rationale as a regional security structure was seriously compromised in August 1990 when the first test of its viability came in the form of an attack on one of its members from another Arab state instead. The GCC states had generously supported Iraq in its long and taxing war with Iran; they had long been encouraged, even by the western powers, to think of Iraq as a major shield in the first line of their defence. For these and other reasons the Gulf rulers did not expect to be so grossly betrayed. But the Gulf war should have taught the lesson that an adequate collective security structure provides for how to deal with threats from within.

Postwar Perceptions of Security Requirements in the Gulf

Arab Views

IRAQ: Regardless of leadership, Iraq is a natural party to any broad collective security arrangements for the Gulf region. Its military and industrial power has been significantly reduced by the war, but many observers have warned that if allowed to rebuild and refurbish its arsenals without strict controls, Iraq could again threaten regional security in the near future. The chastening effect of defeat in the war seems so far to be having desirable results. Relatively stringent armistice conditions have been accepted by the Iraqi authorities without substantial demur; but they have rejected the idea of a U.N. force of police safe havens for Kurdish refugees in northern Iraq. And there may yet be problems of compliance with U.N. requirements for inspection of nuclear research facilities. As long as the leadership that created the original crisis remains in place, Iraq will be the wild card in the new deck. Whatever agreements may be reached by the present government, all bets will be hedged until the parties thereto see what actions emerge.

Iraq's neighbours are under no illusions about their security without a change of régime. Already the old attitudes of enmity and antagonism are creeping back into the language used in state media references to relations with Iran. for their part, the Iranian leadership will feel relaxed about Iraqi intentions only when a new government, preferably a Shi'ite dominated and not a pro-Western one, has replaced the Ba'th party régime. Most of Iraq's Arab neighbours will find it difficult to put full confidence in their Arab brother until a new leadership has taken over and the vestiges of the Saddam era are erased.

GCC [Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE]: The GCC, and especially its most influential member, Saudi Arabia, interpreted Iraq's aggression against Kuwait as aggression against all the member states, and outside help was summoned initially to protect the others from a similar fate. Even collectively these states did not have the population base or manpower potential to match the real power of either Iraq or Iran. Regional critics of the GCC's approach to the security issue say that it was too much influenced by the "doorkeeper (bawwab) mentality"; when you encounter a problem you can't handle, like an aggressive intruder, you call all the landlord. Being pre-occupied with the control and management of their money, the Gulf rulers did not concern themselves sufficiently with security and were content to pay others to protect them in case of an emergency.

The attempt annexation of Kuwait was a serious blow to the Arab interstate system, but an even more damaging demonstration of the inadequacy of the GCC as a viable security structure for the region. The Gulf war would seem to outsiders to have discredited the GCC as a useful instrument for future security in the region. Nonetheless the postwar trend in Arab circles suggests that its members are inclined to the view that it is all they have and it therefore needs to be reinforced and reconstructed rather than scrapped and replaced. There is also interest in several Arab capitals in reviving the suspended Arab Co-operation Council (ACC, consisting of Iraq, Egypt, Jordan and Yemen), primarily an economic grouping, but with original intentions to establish a joint defence pact.

The GCC states met in Riyadh on March 3-4, just as the war ended, and then repaired to Damascus where historic decisions were taken by the six, along with Egypt and Syria, to form an Arab security and peacekeeping force for the region. Egypt and Syria would provide the bulk of the troops in return for economic aid. Two months later, on May 5, the GCC Foreign Ministers met again, this time in liberated Kuwait, to discuss new security arrangements in the region, developments in the Palestinian issue, and GCC-European co-operation. The opening speeches provided an opportunity for self-scrutiny and unusual candour. Chairing the meeting, Qatar's representative opened that the crisis had "clearly revealed loopholes in our defence and security systems. This calls us to work for renewing our defence systems and co-ordinating our military structures".

At this extraordinary meeting of the GCC several other important views emerged. The Kuwaiti Foreign Minister declared that the Damascus Declaration should be the basis for reactivating joint Arab action, a viewpoint embraced by many of the other delegates. GCC Secretary-General Abdullah Bishara added the refinement that because Iraq's invasion of Kuwait had shown the 21- nation Arab League to be outdated, the declaration was the basis of "the new Arab order". He also said that the Gulf ministers still agreed on a regional security force that would include non- Gulf states Egypt and Syria, and would be able to deploy 150,000 peacekeeping troops to deter any future Iraqi aggression. The same source revealed that extensive contacts and negotiations had been held with the Iranians on including them in the security of the Gulf. A final communiqué also emphasized the necessity of maintaining stiff UN sanctions against Iraq until it released all Kuwaiti prisoners, agreed to pay war reparations and destroyed all weapons of mass destruction.

Pressed for details of the new security arrangements, the Secretary-General told reporters that Security in the Gulf was primarily an Arab concern, that the ministers had not discussed any details but only "guidelines and framework", and had not dealt with the presence of Western troops in the area because that issue would be raised in depth with US Defence Secretary Dick Cheney, who would be visiting the region later that week. In a more revealing comment he expressed his view that "There is a conviction that a tranquil and stable Gulf is not possible unless the Middle East problem is solved". At a June 3 session of the GCC, the council stressed its support for the recent Syrian-Lebanese treaty, which puts it squarely at odds with Israel on this matter.

Although Iraq condemned the "Damascus Declaration" of March 6 as "another link in the chain of conspiracies against the Arab nation's present and future", it nonetheless sent representatives, including its former ambassador to Egypt, back to Cairo during the month to represent Iraq in the first Arab League meetings since the war ended. Despite their promises to reinforce Arab solidarity and open a new page in pan-Arab solidarity and open a new page in pan-Arab relations, most members will want to see positive action rather than mere words.

SYRIA: Joining the allied coalition against Iraq in the Gulf conflict was a calculated gamble for the Syrian leader. Years of enmity with the rival Ba'th government in Baghdad made this a logical stand, but joining the moderate Arabs in a US-led coalition against republican Iraq may have cost Hafez al-Asad some credit with the radical Arab camp. It has already paid off handsomely in financial terms. Syria's position on Gulf security is based on the principles and objectives of the Damascus Declaration, but it includes the view that the Islamic Republic of Iran has an important role to play in the regional system. Strong ties forged between Iran and Syria during the Iran-Iraq war may enable the Syrian leader to play a mediating role between the conservative Arab states of the peninsula and Iran. Syria and Iran are also agreed on the need to maintain Iraqi territorial integrity, and greater effort by all parties to establish a just and comprehensive peace in the region. But there may now be some tension between Syria and the GCC states over the latter's agreement to attend the mooted regional peace conference, in view of the fact that Syria has recently declined to budge any further in this direction.

EGYPT: Shortly after the war ended the Egyptian leader, Hosni Mubarak, made a speech in Cairo in which he emphasized that only Arab nations should provide for security to preserve peace in the Gulf region. Speaking in rhetorical terms he declared that a "new dawn" had arrived and that it was time for the Arab nations to put aside their differences and help build a new regional order based on mutual security, economic competition and democratic reforms. His personal adviser, Usama al-Baz, went even further in flatly ruling out any role for American troops in the region. He believed that foreign involvement in any Gulf security force would be detrimental and distorting, and would be viewed in the local environment as an attempt at American hegemony.

Most observers of the Gulf war concluded that Egypt emerged from the conflict with greatly enhanced status in Arab circles. As the most populous Arab country, Egypt's 36,000 troops were the third largest deployment, after the United States and Britain, to Operation Desert Storm. Even more important was the political legitimacy and credibility in Arab and Islamic circles that Egypt's presence lent to the U.S.-led coalition. After the Damascus Declaration it was widely assumed that thousands of Egyptian soldiers, along with Syrians, would remain in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia as the nucleus of a permanent Arab Gulf defence force. On May 8 President Mubarak announced that all Egyptian forces would be withdrawn from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, thus signalling an apparent rift in what had been called the Cairo-Damascus-Riyadh axis during the Gulf crisis.

Iranian Views

The position of the Islamic Republic authorities on security in the Gulf region antedates the recent war. They believe that security is the business of the littoral states of the Gulf and no one else; it is they who should provide it, not outsiders. The experience of the Gulf crisis has only served to confirm their view that security arrangements are the responsibility of eight states, the GCC-six, plus Iraq and Iran. Speaking at a new briefing in Wellington on May 20, Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati said he hoped that the new structure would guarantee the independence and territorial sovereignty of the countries of the region, keep it free of classic armament stores as well as nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and minimize, if not remove completely the need for the presence of foreign powers. "Iran, as the largest country in the Gulf region ... believes that without the mutual co-operation of all the regional countries, no security will be established". Iran's two minimal prerequisites for Gulf security would appear to be a change of regime in Iraq and the full withdrawal of foreign forces.

Israeli Views

Israelis generally breathed a sigh of relief at the result of the Gulf war and the military emasculation of one of the country's most hawkish adversaries. They are somewhat apprehensive about any new arrangements for security in the Gulf which may involve a coalition of Arab forces, including Iraq, whether or not led by Saddam Hussein, and another declared foe, the Islamic Republic. As long as the new Gulf security structure was intended to build stability in the region and was not aimed at Israel, it could expect to gain Israel's unofficial blessing. Apart from the more general anxiety that the "linkage" argument not be used to pressure Israel into exchanging 'land for peace', what seems to concern Israeli officials most is the fear that as a consequence of the war the Arab countries generally will hope to purchase large quantities of weapons to replenish their arsenals, and acquire new weapons as they are developed by Western technology. They are already aware that a large part of the funds paid to Syria in compensation for its role in the anti-Iraq coalition has been used for weapons acquisitions and investment in improving the army's operational capacity.

Western Views

During the Gulf crisis and the war to resolve it the U.S. government, as the leading force in the coalition, was frequently accused of having no postwar plan for stability and security in the Gulf region. Since the war ended some evidence has emerged on the subject of U.S. goals. The general outline of these goals is to establish a permanent battle fleet in the Gulf and store equipment and weapons in several strategic locations in the region as part of an increased commitment to a long-term peacekeeping and deterrent force. The U.S. would also like to station land-based aircraft in the region, but to date no agreement has been reached on where these could be stored. Although the Kuwaitis have reportedly asked for a permanent U.S. troop emplacement, most Arab governments and the U.S. government itself are opposed to such arrangements. in addition to the stockpiling of large quantities of arms in Israel, the most likely locations for U.S. equipment storage in the region are Kuwait and the U.A.E., and for naval forces, Bahrain.

On a four-day visit to the Gulf from May 6, U.S. Defence Secretary Richard B. Cheney talked directly but separately with the leaders of the GCC states to lay the foundation of a new security structure. Although he reported finding a significantly enhanced willingness on the part of many governments to co-operate on security arrangements, a staff writer for The Los Angeles Times (May 10, 1991), filing from Riyadh, said that not one of the six countries he visited would openly embrace any of the arrangement Cheney had come to discuss. The United States is bound to emerge as a much more powerful force in the region after the victory over Iraq, but reaching new agreements will be politically difficult, will not occur without trade-offs, setbacks and frustrations, and require months of tedious negotiations. Whatever accords are finally reached, their details are likely to remain secret.

Outlook

Where does all this leave us? With several obvious dilemmas. Because of its many internal contradictions, a Mutual Defence Organization (MDO) for postwar Gulf security will take many more months to finalize. One of the first fault lines in the new structure is the vexed question of membership: who has legitimate interests in Gulf security, and is therefore entitled to participate? The Iranian view that only littoral states can be involved excludes two non-Gulf Arab major players in the coalition to free Kuwait: Egypt and Syria, the latter a close friend. Their ideological reflex against foreign presence in the region flies in the face of the U.S. led role in the war and the reality of the Gulf as an international waterway. Could Iran, under its present leadership, ever bring itself to play a role in a local security structure which also includes U.S. forces? And then there is the perennial question, do the Gulf Arabs really want another Arab troops based on their territory to defend them, or would they prefer blue-eyed, fair-skinned foreigners? Do they believe that in another case of life or death the only real source of deliverance is America? What is the reality behind the public pronouncements of Gulf leaders?

Another basic problem of defining security in the Gulf region is the broad issue of threats and their sources. Who are the real or potential enemies, and when might they act? For Iran and the GCC states, an Iraq still led by Saddam is a real threat; he will probably act when he feels strong enough again. Some of the gulf states, but by no means all, have reservations or doubts about the ultimate intentions of Iran. Have its current Islamic leaders truly divested themselves of any hegemonic ambitions in the Gulf and opted for mutual defence through co-operation? Barring a reversion to the old régime before perestroika, the Soviet Union is not now or foreseeable a threat to the Gulf as it once was considered to be. For Iran and some more radical Arab states, a permanent U.S. military presence in the Gulf will continue to be reckoned an undesirable compromise on their right to manage the security of the region themselves. But in the wider arena of the Middle East, the most likely source of danger for many Arab states, especially Iraq, which has already felt its sting, is Israel. Without a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian disputes, any security arrangements in the Gulf will be tentative and fragile at best.

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