Dr. W. Millward

September 1991
Unclassified

Editors Note: This issue of Commentary was written by Dr. W. Millward, Strategic Analyst in the Analysis and Production Branch (RAP) of CSIS.

Disclaimer: Publication of an article in the Commentary series does not imply CSIS authentication of the information nor CSIS endorsement of the author's views.

The Changing Geopolitical Environment

The history of the Middle East in modern times is studded with war and conflict. A common western view is that conflict and violence are endemic there, whether the causes are traditional and historical, or more recent and the result of the encounter between traditional Middle Eastern and modern western cultures. However that may be, the Second Gulf War was only the most recent example of the potential for disputes in this explosive region to take on violent international dimensions.

International involvement in the settlement of the Gulf crisis has been heralded in many quarters as a harbinger of future resolutions of disputes in the region and around the world. Because it occurred so quickly and involved such an egregious violation of international law and consensus, there was wide support for the earliest possible resolution of the wrong inflicted on Kuwait. Since the customary rivalry between the superpowers had been replaced by Soviet-US co-operation, it was possible for the UN Security Council to serve as the forum for mobilizing and sanctioning collective action to solve the crisis.

As the pressure on Iraq to leave Kuwait gradually increased and the list of Security Council resolutions of which Iraq was in violation steadily grew, spokesmen for the régime and some of its supporters in other countries wondered why the most recent UN resolutions should receive priority attention. They pointed out at every opportunity that a number of similar resolutions applicable to the region had been passed years ago (viz. 242, 338 and 425), but had been allowed to lapse, or were simply ignored and never implemented.

These observations gave rise to the charge that the United States and some of its allies were guilty of bias and a "double standard" by insisting on immediate implementation of UN-sponsored resolutions against Iraq, while permitting the long-standing resolutions involving Israel to go unfulfilled.

Despite the denial of a formal "linkage" between the Gulf crisis and the Arab-Israeli dispute, there was tacit acceptance among coalition members that once the crisis had been settled, there would be added incentive, if not responsibility, to bring the resources of the coalition and the international community to bear again on solving the Middle East's seemingly intractable problem: the Arab-Israeli-Palestinian disputes.

The United States is in theory able to impose its will on the region, including a settlement of this difficult issue. A victory dividend for the humiliation of Iraq in the gulf is hard to detect unless it could take the form of the United States obliging the Arab states, Israel and the Palestinians to stop their squabbling over procedures and get down to discussion of substantive issues between them with a view to a compromise settlement. The alternative is ongoing strife, violence, and the potential resurgence of terrorist activity in and from the region which will breed further instability and threaten economic growth and predictability.

After the war, James Baker made seven separate trips to the region to persuade both sides to attend a peace conference in October aimed at settling their differences. Most have given either unconditional or qualified acceptance. Some doubt still surrounds the Israeli and PLO positions but there are strong expectations in both camps that they will attend the conference. In late August there were several contingencies which could threaten the peace talks, such as the $10 billion loan guarantee request the Israeli government intended to submit to its American counterpart.

Recent Middle East developments have seen renewed activity for the release of the foreign hostages held in Lebanon by Islamic Jihad, and other hostages, prisoners or detainees held in Israel, south Lebanon and various European centres. A broad agreement to free a majority of these detainees would give a substantial fillip to the emerging conditions conducive to peace and reconciliation in the region. Should the delicate negotiations presently in process ultimately fail, or be derailed by a terrorist incident, the peace process will be psychologically deflated but not cancelled or indefinitely postponed. The desire for peace in the Middle East is clearly gaining momentum both in the region and in the world at large.

Players and Positions

Attention now focuses on the major players-both state and non-state-who will sit down at the same conference table, and their respective demands.

Israel

Israel and its governments have long maintained that they favour direct talks with their Arab opponents as the best means of settling their differences. It is their view that direct negotiations would confer de facto recognition and acceptance of Israel's existence, something they have long sought. However, domestic critics of Yitzhak Shamir's right-wing government have frequently alleged that Israel has learned to live with the intifada and the state of "no peace no war" with its other Arab neighbours, and would prefer to continue the status quo rather than run the risks of the unknowns which could surface at the conference table.

More menacing than the domestic opposition are the ultra-conservative members of the Likud coalition who have threatened to resign if Mr. Shamir agrees to attend a peace conference where they fear he might be pressured into ceding some part of the territories of Judea and Samaria (the West Bank), as part of an overall settlement. How he responds to the new realities, and how far he succeeds in reconciling those with the demands of his own convictions and the expectations of his supporters, will help decide the issue of his government's place in the historical spectrum of Israeli political opinion.

Assessments of the current phase of diplomatic manouvring have emphasized that after 43 years of hot and cold war, Israelis are tired of living in a garrison state and need an agreement with the Arabs that will allow them to live in peace, reduce military spending, concentrate on expanding the economy and creating new jobs to accommodate and unprecedented influx of immigrants: in short, to live as an organic part of the region. Some observers of the Israeli domestic scene have suggested that Likud's main constituency, the disadvantaged Sephardim of Middle Eastern extraction, especially the younger generation of voters, see no point in refusing to yield an inch of land and could well support a territorial compromise in a broad peace agreement. Joined to the mainstream of the Labour constituency and to groups like Peace Now, a majority of Israeli public opinion could be behind compromise.

Be that as it may, the Shamir government has staked out an uncompromising stand of "peace for peace" and no concessions. It reserves the right to attach conditions to the composition of the Palestinian delegation. The Israelis will not confer with any Palestinians who are PLO members, who reside in East Jerusalem, or represent the Palestinian diaspora outside the West Bank and Gaza Strip. There will be no international dimension to the proposed conference, and no UN role of any kind. Israel accepts that the EEC can send a silent observer to the opening ceremonial session, but thereafter the conference will proceed on direct bilateral negotiations between governments. There will be no reconvening of full sessions, even in the event of impasse. The Israeli government accepts the idea of joint US-Soviet sponsorship of the conference provided full diplomatic relations have been restored with the Soviets, or are imminent. The status of Jerusalem is not up for discussion at any point, and land-for-peace is rejected as a viable principle. In the interim there can be no cessation of settlement construction in the Occupied Territories before and during negotiations; for the Israelis the two issues are completely unrelated.

Palestinians

Gulf war postmortems agree that the Palestinians are one of its big losers. The PLO and Yasser Arafat are said to have suffered a substantial loss of status and credibility with their supporters around the world for backing Iraq. In theory the Palestinians are keen to attend a peace conference organized by the US, but their leaders are apprehensive about being pre-empted by agreements already made between the organizer and their antagonist, Israel. West Bank leaders have acknowledged the need to develop a more flexible strategy for making peace with Israel, but fear that even their minimal positions are ruled out by the Israel-US memorandum of understanding. In early August they were therefore in the same position as the other major player, saying "Yes, but ..." to Secretary Baker's invitation.

A major stumbling block for Palestinian participation in the proposed conference is the question of who will represent them. Israel has refused for sometime to have any dealings whatsoever with Palestinians who are members of the PLO. But it adds even further restrictions. On August 2 Prime Minister Shamir told Israel Television that "We have agreements with the United States on the makeup of the Palestinian delegation. There will be no PLO men there; there will be no residents of East Jerusalem, and there will be no people from the Palestinian diaspora [outside the West Bank and Gaza Strip]. It appears the United States has not yet come to agreement with the other side."

Yasser Arafat is said to have responded to Israel's position with the frustrated query, "Then who will they make peace with, ghosts?" In an August 5 interview, West Bank leader Faysal al-Husayni, one of Secretary Baker's major Palestinian interlocutors, indicated that Palestinians would insist on their right to determine their own representation without outside interference, that they would not submit a list of names to anyone beforehand, and that the other participants would only know who the Palestinian representatives were once they entered the conference centre.

The most difficult substantive issues between the Israelis and Palestinians, assuming they agree to negotiate, are apparently the questions of the status of Jerusalem, and the early possibility of an separate and independent state called Palestine in the Occupied Territories. What the Israeli side regards as the capital of Israel now and forever, an integral part of Eretz Israel and not subject to negotiation, the Palestinians regard as an essential part of their patrimony and the future capital of an independent Palestinian state. The latter therefore reject any intimation that Jerusalem could be omitted even from the early stages of the negotiations, and its inhabitants excluded from the Palestinian delegation, as the American plan proposes.

The Palestinian strategy in early August appeared to be to buy time and prolong the current exchanges of views in an effort to get better terms for their agreement to participate, and in the meantime attempt to forge a common negotiating position among the major PLO factions. While spokesmen like Bassam Abu Sharif are used to float more optimistic positions by saying that they do not foresee any obstacle big enough to prevent Palestinians from participating in the peace conference, and Elias Freij, the Mayor of Bethlehem (but not a PLO member) assures his audience that the Palestinians will certainly attend, the last word appears to rest with Arafat. He warned in an August 6 interview that "peace cannot be achieved without the Palestinians", and without PLO approval "not one single Palestinian will show up" at the proposed conference. By mid-August there was talk of a summit among Arab states bordering Israel and the PLO to co-ordinate their approach to the conference, and a plan for the Palestine National Council to meet in Algiers in September to work out negotiating tactics and policies.

Syria

Syria's acceptance of the US proposals for a peace conference was hailed, even in Israel, as a breakthrough. Prime Minister Shamir said he never expected a Syrian leader willing to talk with Israel. The Syrians were said to have learned, from their experience as members of the coalition against Iraq, to see their role in the region in a new light, and they were convinced that the Americans were, for the first time, fully sincere in their desire to sponsor a fair and lasting settlement to the region's perennial problem.

But Syria has since adopted a hard line on the terms of reference for the conference, presumably as a pre-negotiation tactic. The Syrian Vice-President declared on August 4 that his country was committed to supporting the Palestinian Arab people's struggle to achieve their fundamental rights. It would therefore reject any attempt by Israel to set conditions for Palestinian representation at the conference. Syrian Foreign Minister Farouq al-Shara' told a meeting of foreign ministers from the Organization of the Islamic Conference [OIC] that "The conditions set by Israel in the face of the peace conference are rejected in form and content. Palestinian representation at the peace conference is a matter which concerns the Palestinian people alone. Israel has no right to interfere in naming members of the Palestinian delegation or the towns and areas they come from."

The basic question which preoccupies observers of Syria's potential role in the peace conference is whether it will act as a major supporter of the Palestinians throughout the negotiations, or seek to cut a separate deal in bilateral talks with Israel to reclaim control over the Golan territory lost in the Six-Day War of 1967. It is well known that Syria and its leader have been at odds with certain sections of the Palestinian movement for some time now. Posing as the champion of Pan-Arab interests, including the Palestinian cause, has been a cornerstone of Syrian foreign policy over the last five decades. Farouq al-Shara' also told the same OIC meeting that "Jerusalem, the Golan Heights, the West Bank and Gaza Strip should all be returned to their Arab owners."

Jordan

In the long saga of the Arab-Israeli dispute, Jordan is one of the few Arab states whose leadership has engaged in direct, albeit secret, contacts with Israel over mutual problems. King Husayn has repeatedly announced his readiness to engage in direct negotiations with Israel as part of an effort to reach a comprehensive and just settlement of Arab-Israeli issues. In a Jordan TV interviewed on August 7, he reiterated his country's strong support for the US diplomatic initiative, and Palestinian national objectives. Jordan is seen by some as a key player in efforts to convene a regional peace conference because it shares a border with Israel, was the former administrator of the West Bank before it was lost to Israel in 1967, and because it has agreed to assume the responsibility of providing political support for Palestinian involvement in the form of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, provided the latter themselves approve.

Jordan's official posture is to welcome the American initiative, but to play a low-key role in the discussion of the terms of reference and other procedural issues. It co-ordinates its positions with the PLO, Egypt and other Arab states through "active, quiet diplomacy". In an interview with Le Point in late May, he stressed Jordan's support for a solution to the Middle East problem based on UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, the principle of trading land for peace, and the need for Palestinians themselves to be involved in the negotiations on their own terms, able to determine there own future. Although Jordan has offered the device of a joint delegation to ensure Palestinian involvement, Taher al-Masri, the Palestinian-born Prime Minister, emphasized in a parliamentary speech on July 11 that his country regarded the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and Amman would never replace the PLO at any negotiations.

Jordan further believes that a peace conference should have both an Israeli-Palestinian dimension and an Arab-Israeli dimension, including bilateral Jordanian-Israeli issues, but that basically a region-wide solution is required. The reason is that the problems are not simply political but economic, ecological and environmental, and cannot be solved without a holistic approach and collective agreements. Jordan hopes that a Middle East peace agreement would help it recover from the effects of the Gulf crisis, and rescue its staggering economy. It is still reeling under the burden of countless refugees from Iraq and Kuwait. The government also believes that a comprehensive agreement would help it defuse domestic opposition to any attempt at rapprochement with Israel.

Egypt

Another major player pressing for a full-scale Middle East peace conference is Egypt, the only Arab country to have signed a peace treaty and exchanged diplomatic representatives with Israel. Although regarded by some Arab radicals as having sold out the Arab cause, and viewed with suspicion by certain Palestinian groups, Egypt retains a degree of influence in Arab circles and working behind the scenes to persuade both sides of the virtues of flexibility and compromise.

Egypt's official position on the terms of reference for a peace conference was enunciated by Dr. Ismat Abd al-Majid, then Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, on April 10. He emphasized that Egypt supports an international conference, including all concerned parties and the five permanent members of the Security Council. It also calls for the implementation of the UN resolutions on the Arab-Israeli question, and a start to Palestinian-Israeli dialogue. Abd al-Majid added that Egypt believed the Palestinians should choose their own representatives to the conference, that Israel must withdraw from the Arab territories it occupied by force-the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Golan Heights, South Lebanon. The solution to the basic dispute would have to be just and comprehensive if durable peace is to be achieved.

A necessary prerequisite would be Israel's agreement to stop all settlement construction in the disputed territories. Foreign Minister Amr Musa declared on May 24 that Egypt's position was clear: "It is against settling immigrants, whether from the Soviet Union or Falashas, in occupied Arab territories. The building of settlements poisons the general atmosphere around the peace process. A halt will make it easier."

In July Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak urged fellow Arabs to consider suspending their economic boycott of Israel in exchange for a freeze on Israeli settlement in occupied territories. The anomaly of this request was not lost on other Arab states. Although it is the home of the Arab League, Egypt abandoned the boycott when it made peace with Israel in 1979. Egypt's current strategy seems to be one of alternately cajoling and threatening both Israelis and Palestinians into making compromises and finding confidence-building measures. President Mubarak has assumed the role of threatener while his foreign minister is the principal cajoler, though not without an abrasive edge of his own. These tactics have earned Egypt credit in Washington but it remains to be seen how much influence it can exert to ensure that a conference actually takes place.

United States and Soviet Union

The US wants a settlement of this bitter dispute, for its own reasons, perhaps more than the protagonists themselves. Faced with substantially different negotiating positions and procedural obstacles, the question then arises whether the US government now intends to use its muscle with the two sides to oblige them to meet and thrash out their differences face to face? All the indicators suggest that it will.

At a Moscow summit in July, Presidents Bush and Gorbachev announced their intention to sponsor jointly a Middle East peace conference in October in order not to lose the opportunity created by the post-Gulf war atmosphere. A post-summit press conference included the following statement: "The United States and the Soviet Union pledged to do their utmost to promote the peacemaking process. To that end, acting as co-sponsors, the United States and the Soviet Union are going to convene an October peace conference designed to launch bilateral and multilateral negotiations." Since the rupture of diplomatic relations between Israel and the Soviet Union as a result of the Six-Day War in 1967, the Soviets have staunchly supported the Palestinian cause and several Arab states. Having lined up with the United States as co-sponsor of the Middle East conference, many of the principal actors, including Prime Minister Shamir, believe Moscow will have an even more important role to play in the peace process.

Events in the Soviet Union in the second half of August have created many doubts about the possibility that it can play a useful role as co-sponsor. In the wake of the unsuccessful coup against President Gorbachev, speculation has emerged that the conference will have to be postponed until conditions in the Soviet Union are more stable. Despite reassurances from the new Soviet Foreign Minister that the government intends to follow through on its commitment on schedule, the present state of affairs domestically makes it hard to believe that the Soviet Union, in whatever form it may survive, will soon be able to focus its attention on an international problem as complex and delicate as Middle East peace.

Room to Manoeuvre

The above positions suggest that prospects for successful negotiations at a Middle East peace conference in October are not in the least encouraging. The views of the principal actors are far apart and in some cases diametrically opposed. There are also substantial differences between Israel and several of its major Arab interlocutors, such as Jordan and Syria.

Under current circumstances, the opposing sides can perhaps be coerced into agreeing to participate, but contrary to the understanding of most observers, the terms for participation are not simple matters of procedure. On July 31 an aide to Prime Minister Shamir said in a radio interview that "The composition of the (Palestinian) delegation sounds procedural, but for us it is substantive. We are not going to change." Speaking for the Palestinians on the same subject, Hanan Ashrawi said that the fate of the conference still hung in the balance and the Palestinians did not want to compromise any further. The Palestinians, realizing the relative weakness of their position in the general scheme, are planning to consult their own experts in international law to ascertain what legal implications for their interests would be involved if they were to accept Israel's American-backed conditions for convening the talks. They are also hoping to co-ordinate their views and positions with the other Arab states.

What cards does the US hold in its relations with Israel to ensure Israeli attendance at the conference? It has the solid backing of the EEC and the Soviet Union for a tough stand against Israel. And the polls that suggest that 69% of Israelis would be prepared to give up occupied lands in return for a secure peace with Arab neighbours are further trump cards. Some observers also argue that Congress, where Israeli governments are traditionally strongest, is now where Prime Minister Shamir seems weakest. "If President Bush chooses to make an issue of freezing housing loan guarantees to an intransigent Israel, there will not be enough Republicans or Democrats to override a veto." [R.H. Curtiss, The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, August/September 1991. p.7]. The aggressive and belligerent statements of Israeli Housing Minister Sharon regarding planned settlements in the occupied territories and American motives for opposing them may only have strengthened the US hand.

Two Scenarios

There are two primary possibilities for developments in the Middle East peace process from now until next October and beyond. The first is that the proposed conference will not convene because the Palestinian side concludes it should not accept Israel's preconditions for the makeup of its delegation. The Palestinian leadership may decide these conditions are too humiliating, and prefer to take the blame for sabotaging yet another attempt at peace. Yasser Arafat would then prohibit any Palestinian whatsoever from appearing at the conference, and in their absence the other Arab states would most likely fail to attend. This would deliver a substantial propaganda victory to Israel, and further dilute the credibility of the Palestinian desire for peace. But it would be based on the calculation that the cost of not missing this opportunity to miss an opportunity would be less than seizing it. Opportunity is a matter of perception and definition.

A more likely scenario is the prospect that no matter how unreasonable and unjustifiable Israel's conditions, the Palestinians will swallow hard and accept them, disclaiming any necessary implications for the legal status of their delegation in the process. Representatives can be found who meet all the limitations specified by Israel. The main reason for accepting is the fact that the Palestinian leadership is more acutely aware than anyone of its own strategic weakness. After years of checkmate and defeat, some of it self-inflicted, it realizes it has virtually no move to make in the pre-negotiations. Unless they are offered absolutely nothing toward their ultimate expectations, the Palestinians would want to be present at any peace talks to see what transpires and protect their interests as best they can, rather than depending on others.

While the Palestinian leadership may be virtually powerless and its position vulnerable, the broad mass of the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip are even more exposed and suffer daily hardship, deprivation and all too often death. Their kinfolk in Kuwait and other Arab gulf states are being subjected to various forms of prejudicial treatment, including arrest and imprisonment, dismissal from employment, expulsion and other forms of harassment. The remote possibility of some success at what may be the last chance for peace would be an opportunity that even Arafat could not afford to miss. The alternative would be bleak indeed for the survival of Palestinian identity. Israel and its citizens may need a peace agreement in order to cope with pressing problems, but the Palestinians need one even more.

Yet sober assessment of the current Middle East balance of power leads to the view that any United States government hopes of imposing a Pax Americana on Israel and its Arab neighbours are ultimately doomed to fail. It will likely succeed in imposing its will on the belligerents to get them to the table, but its chances of inducing an agreement are negligible. It is obvious that nothing can happen to move the undesirable status quo if the disputants will not even agree to talk. But the Palestinians still demand and expect an independent state ultimately, and the Arab states demand and expect full Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab land. For its part Israel demands and expects peace agreements with its Arab neighbours, including secure borders, and rejects the idea of an independent Palestinian state. The obvious incompatibility of these expectations does not provide grounds for optimism that they can be easily reconciled. All parties have to hope that once they sit down to talk, the chemistry of the dialogue will generate compromise.

Since the balance of power and leverage in present circumstances is so lopsided in favours of Israel, there are no grounds even for cautious optimism that a compromise can be struck. The reasons are not far to seek. Perhaps the most important is the nature of Israel-US relations. In theory the patron-client relationship should enable the US to fix policy and set the agenda. In practice the dynamic between the two is controlled by Israel. [G. Aronson, World Monitor, April 1991. p. 25]. In addition to the traditional dominance of Israeli interests in the formulation of American foreign policy toward the Middle East, the Gulf war provided Israel with both tactical and strategic gains vis-à-vis its patron and its enemies in the region.

The destruction of one of Israel's most hawkish adversaries removed one of its most dangerous threats and tilted the regional military balance further in its favour. The television shots of Iraqi Scud missiles descending on Israel have created an expanded reservoir of sympathy for the Jewish state and served to offset its more recent image as an aggressive and intransigent bully in the region. The moral authority of the intended victim who survived will be a strong strategic asset to Israel when the time comes to resist pressure to compromise and cede territory many Israelis consider vital to the security of the state.

Another reason why Israel under its present government can be expected to resist strenuously any attempt to pressure it into compromise, especially one that involves the formula "land-for-peace", is the country's alleged nuclear arsenal. Had the wartime Iraqi Scuds contained chemical warheads, it was widely assumed that Israel was prepared to respond with "a terrible blow" against the aggressor, thus precipitating a new dimension to the Gulf War beyond the control of the US. In destroying roughly half of Iraq's conventional war machine, and setting up arrangements after the war to dismantle its CBW and nuclear weapons capacity, the US and its western allies removed the chief threat to Israel's security. This was accomplished without requiring any compensating commitment from Israel regarding the peace process. As a result, Israel retains conventional arms superiority over its Arab neighbours, and the presumed nuclear card, remains its ace in the hole.

A further reason Israel's Likud government will not be in a mood to make concessions for peace is its perception that the Arab and Palestinian adversaries are even more dependent on the goodwill and largesse of the US than Israel itself. In postwar deliberations the Arab states of the Gulf have acknowledged this dependence for their regional security. As its defenders so often remind us, for Israel security is everything. The West Bank is needed, it is said, to give Israel strategic depth. Although the concept of strategic depth in the missile/anti-missile age is seriously questioned, many Israelis are unwilling to take the calculated security risk involved in acknowledging an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Older Israelis of the pioneer generation are for the most part not prepared to take the risks the youth might accept; and they are in power. Despite recent polls showing a trend in favour of "land-for-peace", many veteran observers believe that the younger generation of Sephardim are even more hard line, and in the event an election were called soon in Israel, would help re-elect the Likud Party with a clear majority.

The Arab territory that Israel holds is also attractive for settlement purposes. Soviet immigration is continuing apace and more settlements are being expanded or established without let as time passes. The Israeli need for $10 billion in loan guarantees to help accommodate these immigrants will not serve as a lever for exerting pressure on the Israeli side to compromise in peace talks. Contrary to the views cited above, any United States administration veto on such aid would be set aside by a congressional majority vote in favour.

When the chips are down, the US Congress has always proved loyal on issues crucial to Israel. When the Israeli request for loan guarantees comes in early next month, the administration can be expected to request it be postponed for fear it could derail the peace talks. Since the request has been pending for some time now, Israel and its supporters will want to press for early consideration, and this could put the two governments on a collision course. Even so, Israel firmly believes that regardless of its actions and positions, international aid for the immigrant settlements will continue. On August 12 Israel's ambassador in Ottawa announced that Canada had offered $100 million in credits through the Export Development Corporation to help the Jewish state settle an expected 800,000 refugees over the next five years.

And finally, the most credible international support for the Arab and Palestinian positions, as a counterweight to the present imbalance, would come from the United Nations General Assembly. But the UN has been excluded from the current process by Israel, with the acquiescence of the co-sponsors. The Palestinian struggle for self-determination and international recognition of their right to an independent homeland has, however, been closely tied from the beginning to the United Nations system. The international body which played such a crucial role in the creation of the state of Israel moreover will be expected by the world community to use its authority to ensure that the peace process leads to a territorial state of Palestine. Security Council resolutions 242, 338 and 425 are the main international acknowledgements of Palestinian rights and the inadmissibility of Israeli occupation of Arab land. They have been supported with ever-increasing fervour of late by a growing number of non-governmental organizations world-wide.

No wonder then that the Likud government rejects any significant role for the UN in the peace process. It knows the UN and many of its agencies have been literally deluged by protests from member governments, including those of Germany, Japan and Canada, regarding Israel's failure to apply, or violations of, the Fourth Geneva Convention in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as well as its so-called "security zone" in South Lebanon. The pretext for Israel's rejection of any UN role is the "Zionism is a form of racism" resolution (3379) of 1975. Since then Israeli governments have regarded the United Nations as an assembly dominated by a "tyrannical majority"which happened to be unsympathetic to Israel's security needs and territorial ambitions. But the resolution came from the General Assembly: there is now a movement in place to have that motion rescinded since many governments that voted in favour originally are believed to have reconsidered.

Given the long and intimate connection of the UN with this dispute, it will be difficult for many hopefully and expectant outsiders to see how excluding the UN at this stage can possibly be helpful. The UN was the major international forum enlisted to authorize sanctions against Iraq, including the use of force, for its violation of Kuwait's sovereignty. The UN is centrally involved currently in negotiations for a general hostage release in the Middle East. President Bush expressed his personal gratification that the UN had a Secretary-General who was willing to go the extra mile to obtain results. The UN is also visibly successful in other conflicts. Tripartite talks in Islamabad involving Iran, Pakistan and the Afghan Mujahedin recently resulted in a qualified endorsement of the UN five-point peace plan for Afghanistan. In the Morocco-Western Sahara dispute, MINURSO has been assigned to supervise the referendum to determine the future of the Western Sahara.

Between the major protagonists-Israel and the Palestinians, i.e. the PLO, and its Arab neighbours-there is no room for compromise on declared positions. The bottom line is ultimately the issue of a land base for the independent Palestinian state already declared. If not in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, then where? The Israeli answer is Jordan. The Palestinian response is that they accept a two-state solution to the dispute and the implementation of all relevant UN resolutions; its representatives in the occupied territories would be willing to join a negotiating team with a view to implementing this solution in stages. This means in effect that they would accept the autonomy plan, rejected by them in the past, for a transition period of between three and five years. During this period, internationally supervised elections would take place on the West Bank and Gaza, enabling the Palestinians to choose their negotiating team, elect local councils to run daily affairs, and eventually pave the way for a national assembly to assume governmental responsibilities once the territories move beyond the transition stage to full independent status. [E. Zureik, NECEF Report, June 1991. p. 8]. The Likud government of Israel does not foresee a time when these territories would become an independent state in the full sense of the word.

In any peace conference it may attend Israel's priority will be to reach bilateral agreements with its Arab neighbours. The most important talks from Israel's point of view will be with Syria on the issue of sovereignty in the Golan Heights, taken by conquest in the Six Day War of 1967. Syria wants all the territory back. A compromise that might be acceptable to Israel would be to divide the territory roughly in half, with Israel keeping the ridge overlooking Tiberias, and the whole region to be demilitarized. The two countries would then agree to terms for joint supervision and enforcement. This way Syria would recover much of the land it lost, and Israel's security concerns would be answered. The joint sponsors, especially the US, would intervene in the event of deadlock to pressure both sides into compromise.

It can be confidently predicted that both sides will hold to their maximum positions and resist pressure to compromise. Syrian President Hafez al-Asad would be politically unable to accept terms for a settlement with Israel which were less favourable than those gained by Egypt when it recovered the Sinai after Camp David. Israeli negotiators will be loath to put any part of the Golan back in the hands of Syria under its present leader so he could attack Israel again at will. The US will be unable to oblige an Israeli withdrawal and will eventually acquiesce to the status quo. Even if the Syrian president was not promised the return of the Golan Heights for his agreement to attend the conference, Israeli-Syrian tension and animosity will continue to poison relations between the two neighbours and the atmosphere in the region. It will remain a highly volatile flashpoint in regional conflict.

Spoilers: The Risks of Failure

There are several groups on both sides of the Middle East's fundamental dispute who would not like to see any meeting between the belligerents to talk about peace. On the Israeli side there are the heads of the two, small, right-wing splinter parties-members of the Likud Front-and Housing Minister Ariel Sharon of the government's own party who voted in cabinet against the approval of talks. These forces could bring down the Likud government in a vote of non-confidence and force a new election, as happened in the spring of 1990. This process would take four months to complete and would only produce a new Israeli government when the present American administration would be handicapped by the run-up to US elections in November 1992.

On the Palestinian side, the Unified Command of the Palestinian Uprising-the PLO-backed but not controlled group running the intifada-have said they consider the peace conference proposal a zionist plot. Palestine Islamic Jihad has threatened to murder Faysal al-Husayni and any other Palestinian who agrees to attend the peace talks. Hamas is opposed to the talks and expects them to fail but will not obstruct. The PLO itself will decide finally at the Palestine National Council meeting in September whether it will agree to Israeli conditions for Palestinian representation; it still has the power to prevent any Palestinian involvement.

Fierce opposition to US plans to convene a peace conference has also been voiced by political groups in Lebanon who would like to prevent them altogether, but especially Lebanese government participation. At the head of these groups is the pro-Iranian Shi'a fundamentalist faction Hizbollah. Since the Iranian government is vehemently opposed to the idea of talks, and apprehensive that its Syrian ally has agreed to them, it is not surprising that Hizbollah and others have announced their intention of escalating attacks against Israel's self-declared security zone in South Lebanon in the hope of provoking a major Israeli reprisal.

Other opponents of the talks are the Supreme Shi'a Council of Lebanon, and the moderate Shi'a party Amal, led by Nabih Berri. Such groups would need the support of outsiders to be able to launch significant attacks on Israel and its proxy, the South Lebanese Army. They are therefore in touch with several radical Palestinian groups-the PFLP-GC, DFLP and Abu Nidal's Fatah Revolutionary Council-to enlist sufficient aid in their plan to derail any peace conference. A substantial operation in Israel or against Israeli interests could cause a major Israeli response but would not necessarily torpedo hopes of peace talks between Israel and Lebanon.

The risks of failure in promoting peace in the Middle East are high and the consequences are likely to be dramatic. After years of impasse in efforts to reach agreement through the Geneva Conference, and the buildup of expectation following the Second Gulf war, even prolonged and inconclusive negotiations at a peace conference could lead to a sudden perception of letdown and disappointment which would quickly give way to despair. The consequences for the Palestinians, who are already hurting badly, would be devastating. In the words of Palestinian political science professor Sa'eb Erakat, "And desperation not only leads to desperate acts, it leads to desperate thinking." [Globe & Mail, September 5, 1991].

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ISSN 1192-277X
Catalogue JS73-1/12