By
Philippe LEJEUNE

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of MS in the Administration of Justice with a concentration in Applied Intelligence

Thesis advisor : Dr. Frank E. Hagan
Mercyhurst College
Administration of Justice Graduate Program
MAY 1998

Abstract
By
Philippe LEJEUNE

This research offers a critical approach to different anti-terrorism measures, that are or were used by democratic states in the 20th century. It offers a descriptive approach based on the existing academic literature on terrorism and democratic states and consists of five parts. The first part offers some reflections on the definitional problem of terrorism. A comprehensive definition on terrorism should include both terrorist activities that are directly related to the political goals of the group and activities that pursue the collection of the necessary funds to carry out attacks. Secondly, it appears that, while terrorists are generally incapable of overthrowing a democratic regime, there is a danger that the state will overreact, by overestimating the real threat, and therefore, it is possible that a democracy destroys itself in the process of fighting terrorists. Moreover, the links between terrorism, organized crime and guerilla activity are examined, to conclude that there is a convergence between the three phenomenons in some cases. Thirdly, the two main ideological conceptions of terrorism are discussed, and neither of them seems able to address the issue of terrorism in all its aspects. History has shown that a hard-line approach to terrorist activity is sometimes ineffective, especially if a terrorist group is defending a cause, that is considered legitimate by a significant part of the local population. On the other hand, a more liberal approach fails to take into account that terrorist groups are often involved in organized crime, and therefore, repressive measures by the state are often necessary. In general, ideology has always clouded the objective study of terrorism as a criminal or policy issue, which explains the lack of consensus within the academic community regarding the opportunity of specific anti-terrorism measures. A fourth part of the study describes some options that states have when combating terrorism. A critical reflection on preemptive measures and their legitimacy is offered. Moreover, a certain number of legislative, international, military and operational measures are examined. Finally, the overall conclusions of the research are presented. In order to elaborate a viable policy, it is important to evaluate the threat accurately. This problem is related to the definitional problem. A simplistic "no-compromise" policy, as defended by some countries, will be effective in most cases. Generally speaking, the strength of a terrorist group will depend on two factors: the number of its supporters within the general public and their access to funds to carry out operations. However, the fact that terrorists are highly dependable on these two elements, allows the state to combat them on these two levels. If the public approval for the cause of a terrorist group is high, the state should consider a structural approach, to address the root problem. At the same time, intelligence and law enforcement agencies should attempt to determine the sources of income of terrorists (crime, revolutionary taxes, contributions from other countries), and try to act on that aspect, which will significantly diminish the overall threat. Finally, a certain level of terrorist activity has always existed through history and it will never be possible to eradicate the phenomenon completely.
Chapter I: Describing terrorism in function of its finality (edited)     p. 1
Chapter II: Terrorism and the State.

After having discussed the problem of defining terrorism in the first chapter, chapter II and III will examine the relationship between the state and terrorism. Understanding this relationship is necessary to permit the assessment the effectiveness of several anti-terrorism policies.

More specifically, two topics will be treated in this chapter. First of all, there is a need to answer the question whether terrorism is effective as form of political dissent. In order to do so, several fields of study need to be considered. History, for one, enables the consideration examples of terrorist activities in the past and judge the importance of the changes brought about by terrorist groups. Political science and sociology are useful in explaining the reaction of the policy makers when they are confronted with terrorist activity. Secondly, before discussing how to deal with terrorism, it is important to understand that terrorism can take very different forms. In some areas of the world, such as the Middle East, there exist terrorist groups who, for all practical purposes, operate as regular armies. The Party of God (Hizb Allah), for example, controls a significant part of Lebanon, has training camps and advanced weaponry. On the other end of the spectrum the Algerian Groupe Islamique Armé, who is not only involved in terrorist activity, but also in traditional criminal activities. These two examples show clearly that the distinction between terrorist activity, organized crime and unconventional warfare is sometimes vague. This trend, then, must be taken into account by the political decision-makers, in order to formulate a comprehensive anti-terrorism policy.

Section 1: The effectiveness of terrorism

Are terrorists likely to succeed, i.e. achieve their political, religious or social goals through the tools and tactics they use? More specifically, can the phenomenon of terrorism be a direct threat to a democratic state? The answers to these questions are important in order to determine in later chapters how far a democratic state can infringe on individual liberties in order to protect those very same rights.

Sederberg points out that there is a fundamental problem in determining the effectiveness of terrorism, namely that it requires " establishing the precise contribution of particular actions to the achievement of purported goals, whether tactical or strategical."

Most authors who write about terrorism have considered this question. In his comments on this issue, Laqueur makes a distinction between individual assassinations of state leaders and systematic terrorist campaigns. He argues that individual assassinations of state leaders had, contrary to the popular belief, generally little impact on the general course of history. The most cited example of a terrorist act that changed the course of history of courses the assassination of throne successor Franz-Joseph in Sarajevo in 1914. Laqueur, however, and with him many other historians, points out that a war was unavoidable at that time and, consequently, the dead of the Archiduc was at best a mere trigger event. Lynch thinks that the "Sarajevo effect" made terrorism more attractive. Lynch’s assessment seems realistic, for it is logical that if there is a general belief that terrorism can influence history, then it is likely to be increasingly used to obtain changes in society.

Laqueur claims that systematic terrorist campaigns have not been much more successful. Never once in history, a terrorist group was able to destroy a democracy or any other nation state. It is true that the Front de Libération Nationale was successful in obtaining the independence of Algeria, that the Irgun and Stern gang realized their political goals by the declaration of independence of Israel in 1947, but in these cases, the final result was caused by a general uprising, not by terrorist activity alone. The Intifada, the uprising of Palestinians in the occupied territories of the West bank and the Gaza Strip between 1987 and 1995, is yet another example, that the only hope for terrorists lies in causing a popular insurgency. Sederberg cites, in the same sense, as one of the conditions for terrorist to be effective the need for support from members of some ethnic, religious or national group. That leads to the conclusion that the fight for self-determination is probably the kind of terrorist campaign that is most likely to succeed, and just because of the fact that it is more than a mere terrorism or security problem.

And precisely therein lies the threat of terrorism towards open societies. Normally, an open democratic society will not be overthrown by revolution, because there is an outlet for political discontent in the normal process of governing. Only a very small minority of extremists will turn to violent methods. However it has happened that democracies destroy themselves in the process of fighting terrorism. Boywer Bells calls it " ...the temptation for the state (..) To mimic practices of terrorist groups...." As Lynch states, if the response to terrorism involves suspension of democratic freedoms, this will play to the advantages of terrorists. He gives the example of massive arrests by a government to combat terrorists. Often the real dangerous elements will escape in those actions, but the public confidence will be dealt a blow. Poland stresses the fact that one of the goals of terrorism is to provoke government overreaction, especially indiscriminate action.

The events of the 1960´s and 70´s in Uruguay provide the best example of how a democratic government can undermine itself by overreacting to terrorist threats. White writes that the government copied the techniques of the Tupamaros, namely kidnapping and murder. While it might have been considered as an efficient technique (indeed, the Tupamaros were eradicated), but in the end, revolutionary terrorism was only replaced by repressionist terrorism, when the right-wing government declared martial law in 1972.

Italy almost underwent the same fate in the 1980’s. On December 12, 1969, the Brigatte Rossi, a left-wing terrorist group, started an extremely intensive terrorist campaign in Italy. The Italian government, who at first underestimated the threat, was not able to anticipate the increase of violence during the 70's. Das also points out that the Italian situation was very specific: " Italian terrorism became a unique phenomenon for the Western world insofar as a high number of people of different ideological persuasions joined the ranks of the terrorists." This remark is important, because it shows that the Red brigades were almost able to create a limited popular uprising and were not only confined to terrorist activities by a small group of people. Not prepared, faced with a considerable threat, Italian law enforcement reacted in the worst possible way. Das reports 150 fatal shootings of civilians during the period in which the red brigades were active. Several rather extreme legal measures were put in place, all aimed at extending the powers of law enforcement and intelligence agencies. A repentance law was voted, providing substantial reduction of sentences for terrorists, who cooperated with the authorities. Although those laws were successful in halting terrorist activities in the late 1980's, Das notes that "Italian society was deeply divided in its reaction to powers given to the agents of justice in their fight against terrorism." Can one not conclude then that, despite the obvious threat of terrorism and the many victims killed by the Red Brigades, poor government decision making contributed to the problem, instead of solving it? History cannot be rewritten, and it will never be known if Italy was ever close to a complete breakdown between government and the general population. It is the author’s opinion that this risk was very real.

If it is recognized that a democracy is in danger of destroying itself by overreacting to a terrorist threat, then can be thought about terrorism within a different framework than Laqueur and other defenders of the " conservative position". As mentioned in chapter I, Laqueur refuses to take into account "terrorism from above". Speaking about "terrorism from above" or state terrorism implies taking a position on the very nature of terrorism. it involves recognizing that a state sometimes uses illegitimate violence, such as torture, murder, abduction, and the like. The debate on "crime by the government" and "state terrorism" is often very heated. While everyone can agree that this existed in Nazi-Germany or Pot Pol's Cambodia, the question as to whether certain anti-terrorist actions of, for example, Israel, Italy or the United Kingdom can be qualified as terrorist themselves is much more controversial. However, in the light of the examples given above, it is impossible to deny that in some cases, dissent terrorism is closely related to state terrorism. The first step to objectively discuss this issue is to admit that democracies can and have been guilty of excesses in their fight against terrorism. Illegitimate violence, sometimes with tactical success, has been used and cost the lives of innocent people. In other cases, criminals (terrorists) have been convicted without the benefit of due process.

Olson-Raymer offers an interesting perspective on the nature and evolution of terrorism; through her examination of case studies regarding countries faced with a terrorist threat, she argues that terrorism has a cyclical nature. This implies that often, dissent terrorism intensifies in level, by a counter -terrorist reaction from the state or that terrorist actions by the state will ultimately lead to terrorism from below. Lynch indirectly agrees with this, by arguing that a state is often confronted with the desire of revenge from victims of terrorists, which can engender impatience with democratic means. This will ultimately lead to a " cycle of rising violence".

This framework of reference, of course, gives us a radically different perspective than Laqueur, who considers terrorism to be a phenomenon that is mainly limited to democracies. He defends the following viewpoint " in our time, the record shows that the more severe the repression, the less terrorism occurs." He illustrates this with many examples. In my view, however, and without arguing the accuracy of his examples, Olson-Raymer's explaining of terrorism seems more convincing. The situation in Israel and Northern Ireland shows clearly that terrorism has often deep historical roots, and that no party involved in the conflict is free of guilt in dealing with terrorist situations. Moreover, in my opinion, Laqueur neglects one important factor, by saying that it is not usual to hear about terrorist activities in dictatorships. The reason could be that a dictatorial state has better control of its media. Consequently, it might very well be that those attacks are unknown to the rest of the world, because of censorship, not because it does not happen. Sometimes the media will report on terrorist activity in China, not exactly the most democratic society on the face of the earth. Since 1997, an ethnic Moslem group, the Uighur, has carried out attacks in the province Xinjang and even in Beijing. To provide but one example, on February 16, fourteen people were killed in a bus explosion in the city of Wuhan. Despite the fact that the Chinese authorities declared martial law in the area, terrorist attacks continue. The French occupation of Algeria is another example. The army was able to eradicate temporarily the FLN in Algiers, but terrorist activity was happening, despite martial law. The regime of Colonel Muammar Khadafi in Libya faces an increased terrorist threat from Muslim fundamentalists, who have called the famous Green Book (an extension and interpretation of the Koran written by Khadafi) as heresy. Finally, the Egyptian government is still faced with a serious terrorist threat from the Jihad and the Gama'a al Islamiya, despite the very harsh measures taken by president Hosni Mubarak.. This shows that there are as many examples that contradict Laqueur as there are examples that confirm his position. But in many cases, we can see clearly that effective tactical measures do not matter in the long term, especially if those measures are restricting civil liberties and are perceived as violent and indiscriminate.

However, it must be noted that no theory will universally explain the concept of terrorism. Even the well -balanced view of Olson Raymer on the cyclical nature of terrorism has its shortcomings. It does not explain some of the emergence of left-wing terrorism in Germany (Rote Armee Fraction), France (Action Directe) and Belgium (Cellules Communistes Combattantes) in the past two decades. Inversely, the European Jews did nothing that could have unleashed the acts of state terrorism by the Nazi reign of Adolph Hitler in Germany. Once more, this shows us the fundamental truth in Laqueur’s remark that a unique, universal explanation of terrorism is an illusion.

To conclude this discussion on the effectiveness of terrorism, it is important to realize that terrorist activity does not take place in a vacuum. Rather, increases and decreases in terrorism are the result from an interaction between terrorist activity and counter terrorist initiatives. The two are inherently linked, because the real danger of terrorism often lies in the reaction to terrorism, rather than in the violence of terrorists themselves. This is an argument, that will be rejected by many "conservative" terrorism experts, and it must be stressed that this study is not meant to be a moral justification for terrorism as a means of political dissent. The only reason why this debate is outlined is to demonstrate the need for well-thought out policy responses to a terrorist threat and to warn of the danger of overreaction. In other words, a simplistic approach, especially when domestic terrorism is concerned, will only further serve the terrorist groups, because repression provides terrorist groups with political opportunities and support from both the local population and the international community. Tactical measures alone, without the willingness to look at the political situation and the roots of the violence, are doomed to be ineffective in the long term. The state that falls into this pitfall looses its moral ground and the raison d'être of its preservation as a legitimate entity. The latest developments in Israel illustrate very well that this risk is real. The government of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has consistently reacted in a harsh way whenever Hamas or the Palestinian Jihad carried out an attack on Israeli territory. After the double and triple suicide attacks from the terrorist group Hamas on July 30 and September 5, 1997, the Israeli government closed down the occupied territories and proclaimed an embargo of Palestinian products. Even if it might be rather as effective on the tactical level, in the long term, however, this course of action could harm Israeli interests, because it creates resentment from the Palestinian population and could very well lead to a shift of power from the "moderate" Palestinian Liberation Organization of Yassir Arafat to the more radical HAMAS movement of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin.

Section 2: The different faces of terrorism.

Having explored how dangerous terrorism is or can be to Western societies, the next step in this descriptive phase consists of explaining how terrorism relates to organized crime and to warfare.

1. Terrorism and Organized Crime

Narco-terrorism became in the past decade a fashionable term, but many writers attributed many different meaning to this concept. This concept is the one that immediately comes to mind when discussing terrorism and organized crime. However, the purpose of mentioning organized crime in the present study should be clear. Organized crime is examined in the light of political terrorism (as this concept was outlined in Chapter I). In consequence, terrorist methods used for criminal purposes will be disregarded, because they do not fall into the scope of this study. An excellent example of the use of terrorist methods for criminal purposes are the Colombian cartels. At a certain moment, some of those cartels were involved "terrorist" attacks against the government, to oppose the vote of an extradition and law enforcement cooperation treaty with the United States. Strictly speaking, there is a political project, but it is so limited and so closely related to crime activities, which is the core- activity of the cartel, that it does not make sense to attribute political motives.

As a general rule, we can say that terrorists, in order to pose a real threat, need access to large sums of money. Safe houses, cars, explosives, remuneration, false passports are just a few of the expenses terrorist organizations are facing. This makes it easy to understand that often, terrorist organizations are involved in organized crime activities. Laqueur points out that robberies, kidnappings for ransom and especially the drug trade, are activities with which many terrorist groups are quite familiar.

The French Terrorism expert Xavier Raufer sees an evolution in world-wide terrorism: whereas in the 70's and 80's, the terrorist scene was dominated by "guerilla parties", who lasted in time, had strict command structures, could be understood in the political context Of the Cold War, and often were state-sponsored, the last decade on the contrary has been characterized by more loosely organized terrorist entities, using primitive weaponry, and involved in much smaller conflicts world-wide. He refers to them as " new, hybrid entities" or "gangsterrorists". The core idea is that, for this new type of groups, the political and criminal dimension of their activities becomes extremely vague. His main examples are the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party), the G.I.A. ( Groupe Islamique Armé) and the Tamil Tigers for the Liberation of Eelam. This interesting viewpoint is hardly new however. Raufer restates a problem that the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation discovered almost twenty years ago. On October 20, 1981 remnants of various New Left organizations carried out a bloody robbery in Nanuet, New York. This robbery caused great turmoil in the United States because all of the groups involved were thought to be inactive at that time. The main point that must be made here is simply that law enforcement was not prepared to deal with this new contingency, just as today, those responsible for anti-terrorism measures are not prepared to deal with the PKK and the GIA, as far as the criminal side of their operations is concerned. Olson- Raymer offers an attempt at an explanation for this phenomenon referred to as "motivational modernization". In the 1980's criminal activity by terrorists, if any, was clearly a secondary activity. Today, however, we are confronted to a situation in which the economic (read criminal) activities of a group are becoming one of the core activities, necessary for the survival of the group and to allow them to plan ahead. The lead example of this trend is the Kurdish separatist movement PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party). This organization had its roots in the 1960's among left-wing students at the University of Ankara. The PKK is a Marxist-Leninist organization, whose goals are to create an independent Kurdish state with a communist government. The movement is waging a guerilla war in the part of Turkey they are claiming as their territory (the Southeast of Anatolia). Their struggle involves more than 10,000 members and has been lasting for more than 13 years. Considering the many Kurdish refugees living in Europe, the PKK realized quickly that exporting heroin from the Golden Crescent to Europe would allow them to benefit from vast financial resources. It is not a small operation: according to Interpol statistics, the Kurdish drug connection marketed 345 tons of heroin in 1995. The PKK has created a very lucrative triangular trade: members of their organizations steal cars in Europe, export them to Middle- east to exchange them against heroin, which then is sold in Europe to generate cash or buy weapons for the struggle for the independence of Kurdistan. Furthermore, the Van Traa report concluded that the PKK was also deeply involved in extortion in the Netherlands.

Another very obvious reason for this evolution is of course the fact that, since the end of the Cold War, we have witnessed a decrease in state sponsoring of terrorism, especially as far as Cuba is concerned.

Organized crime is mentioned here, because without understanding how this factor influences contemporary terrorism, we will not be able to efficiently act against those groups. Investigating anti-terrorism does not consist solely of looking at clear politically motivated actions of terror. It also requires knowledge on the involvement in crime of these groups, albeit solely in the purpose of discovering how many funds they can dispose of. In the aforementioned example of the PKK, European law enforcement authorities were able to find evidence of institutional links between the drug trade and the PKK's propaganda apparatus, namely the Kurdistan Comité and MED-TV. A very successful operation of Scotland Yard and the Belgian Gendarmerie, under the code name SPUTNIK , led to the seizure of 350 million Belgian Francs (roughly $ 8 million) in a Luxembourg bank and revealed an extremely complicated financial construction, with branches to other European countries and Canada.. Further investigation revealed that the PKK disposed of 15 Belgian companies, used for money laundering operations. This example should give an impression of the high degree of complexity of this phenomenon.

Without this type of intelligence, a proactive course of action against terrorists is a mere illusion. Income is the lifeblood of any prolonged terrorist organization. If it is possible to attack them on that front, a significant step has been taken in the fight against terrorism. Raufer confirms this by arguing that European and North American governments must define a new doctrine to combat these changing threats. This idea will be further developed in chapter 5 of this study.

B. Terrorism and low intensity conflicts.

In chapter 4 of this study, an overview of different measures that a government has at its disposal to fight terrorism, will be provided. A few of those policy options pertain to the intervention of the military. This is a significant problem in any civil society. In order to understand what is at stake when a government decides to rely on the military to deal with this kind of threat, it is necessary to examine the relationship that exists between terrorism and warfare. The first remark on this issue pertains to the moral justification of terrorism. The phrase "One man’s terrorist is another man's freedom fighter" refers to this issue. Freedom fighter implies a legitimate battle, for legitimate purposes. In the same perspective, terrorist often use terms that refer to warfare. Examples are numerous: the Irish Republican Army, the Red Army faction, the Japanese Red Army, the Islamic Salvation Army are just a few of the terrorist groups that wish to convey a sense of legitimate warfare against the state. Moreover, Laqueur argues, correctly in my opinion, that " guerilla has acquired over the ages a positive attractive meaning, whereas terrorist has not." Laqueur, as a consequence, does not consider terrorism, revolutionary (guerilla) warfare. The essence of guerilla lies in the fact that it tries to seize control of areas, mainly in the countryside, which serve as a basis for further operations, for training camps and for generating income. The ultimate goal of guerilla warfare is to build an army, in order to win an open confrontation with government forces. Terrorists on the other hand, are more active in cities, and their tactics of surprise attacks and bombings, are aimed at avoiding such an open confrontation with regular army units. This idea is expressed by the phrase " terrorism is the poor man's war" . In Laqueur's opinion, terrorism has become much more prevalent in the world than guerilla activity since the end of the decolonization period. This statement seems not entirely correct. Raufer's assessment of trends, which claims that new groups are often involved in a combination of guerilla and terrorist activity, appears more accurate. There is a triangular activity. Groups such as the PKK and Hizb Allah use guerilla techniques on the domestic front, which results in them controlling certain areas). Moreover, they are responsible for terrorist attacks (such as arson, bombings). Finally, they finance the aforementioned activities with crime, especially narcotics trade of course.

The remark that was made earlier about the need of a new doctrine on anti-terrorism takes now its full significance. Indeed, the above shows that we are confronted with a national security problem (both military and civilian), a law enforcement problem (in terms of crime committed) and a political problem (the nature of activities of international terrorist groups is intimately linked to the foreign policy of that country). These phenomena, generally labeled as gray area phenomena, require non-traditional strategies to deal with these problems. Warfare is now a tool available to non-state players, namely terrorists.

Where does these observations lead? First of all, terrorism is compatible with neither Ius ad Bellum or Ius in Bello. Those two terms refer to a code of warfare, i.e. conditions in which warfare is "lawful". Ius ad Bellum (the right to war) refers to the rules under which a state may declare war. Under the United Nations Charter, the Security Council has the monopoly of violence, with as notable exception the right to self-defense of each state (article 51 of the charter). Ius in Bello edicts limitations on how to wage war. Most of those conditions are determined by the four Geneva Conventions. Moreover, most dispositions of the Universal declaration on Human Rights are also applicable in case of war. This brief overview clearly shows that terrorists do not wage war, according to the rules accepted by the global community. Just to give a few examples: terrorist groups are not nations-states and therefore, have no right, to declare war; terrorist attacks take place in peace time, without a declared state of war, terrorist carry out attacks against non-combatant targets (civilians), terrorist do not wear uniforms and they use non-discriminate weapons, some of them outlawed by the Geneva Conventions. Terrorist, then, even if they claim to be "warriors", "soldiers" or "freedom fighters", cannot claim any legitimacy on that level. Some authors, such as Lynch, have retained that fact to found their terrorism definition. Critics of this position will readily argue that the respect of the Geneva Conventions is a luxury that only major nations- states can afford. Hagan reports that one of the most persistent fallacies in the field of terrorism is the fact that "terrorism is believed to be a weapon of the poor". Sederberg points out that this viewpoint completely fails to account for state terrorism. Secondly, our remarks about organized crime and terrorism show that terrorist groups are not necessarily poor. In fact, James Adams destroyed that myth thoroughly in his superb research on the finances of terrorists. The next chapter will discuss other aspects of this problem, but the general idea is that terrorists, although it is not impossible that there is a social or political injustice that motivates their actions, often use terrorism to obtain what they cannot obtain through democratic elections. Their weakness then, is the result of democracy, and lies in the fact that they "represent" a minority". Sederberg, referring to "the myth of weakness", remarks also that "the presumed weakness of groups that resort to terrorism refers mainly to the resources they control in relation to the ambitions they possess."

Secondly, we have to conclude that our policies have to combine law enforcement techniques, military operations and diplomacy and political measures. This of course, is easier said than done. Involvement of the military in a democracy is a delicate problem, especially the determination of the extent to which the military can be involved within national boundaries. This involves a political decision, involving legislative power, based on a threat assessment or risk analysis, which assumes that there is a consensus supported by the majority of the population. This being said, our analysis has completed a full circle, because the problem of involvement of the military in anti-terrorism brings us back to our initial topic: how far can a democracy go in combating terrorism without destroying itself. The answers to this question differ largely within the "terrorologist" community. According to the answer formulated by these experts, they fall into the category of "conservative" or "liberals". Chapter III will demonstrate that neither side has been able to answer the question once and for all.

The remainder of the paper contains the following:
Chapter III: The academic debate on the causes of and the state responses to terrorism: the conservative versus the liberal approach     p. 30
Chapter IV: Anti-terrorism measures : an overview     p. 44
Section 1: Proactive, reactive and preemptive measures     p. 44
Section 2: Specific anti-terrorism measures     p. 47
A. Legal measures : emergency and exception legislation     p. 47
A.1. Definition of new penal offenses     p. 48
A.2. Creation of state security or anti-terrorism courts     p. 49
A.3. Extension of law enforcement powers     p. 50
A.4. Critical comments on legislative anti-terrorism measures     p. 51
B. Security measures     p. 53
B.1. Target hardening     p. 53
B.2. Anti-terrorism intelligence     p. 55
C. Involvement of the military     p. 58
D. International cooperation and treaties     p. 63
Chapter V: Lessons and conclusions     p. 70
Bibliography     P. 79

About the Author:

Philippe has recently completed his Masters in The Administration of Justice with a concentration in Applied Intelligence at -Mercyhurst College ( PA, USA) Prior to attending Mercyhurst Philippe received   degrees in Law ( 1994- Catholic University of Louvain- Belgium) and Law and Information technology (1995 -University of Namur- Belgium)

After that, he went to the US after meeting Mr. Heibel. During his masters there he became interested in terrorism and political violence. While at Mercyhurst Philippe completed his thesis is on terrorism, and during the winterterm he taught part of a seminar on terrorism, namely an Introduction to Islamic Fundamentalism, history of the Muslim Brotherhood and political violence in Egypt, an overview of the Middle-East and the "Palestinian question", an overview of  left wing terrorism in Europe in the 70-80's decade.

Philippe is now living, and working, in France. He can be contacted by email at: This e-mail address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it


Copyright 1998©Philippe LEJEUNE